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NOTES
TIME FOR AN UPDATE:
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES
Michael J. Deitch*
Municipal bankruptcies have been making national news since the
“Great Recession.” Municipalities like Stockton, Vallejo, and Jefferson
County gained notoriety for the record scale of their bankruptcy filings,
only to be surpassed by Detroit shortly thereafter as the largest and most
populous municipal bankruptcy filing. Historically, municipal bankruptcy
occurred infrequently, leaving the nuances of many critical issues,
including insolvency, asset utilization, and good faith, unexplored in case
law. For example, how should a bankruptcy court analyze Detroit’s cityowned art museum that houses billions of dollars of art when bondholders,
pensioners, and other unsecured creditors have unpaid claims? And how
should a court determine if the city’s debt adjustment plan is fair at the
confirmation phase, when recent proposals have left certain unsecured
creditors receiving pennies on the dollar while others receive full value?
This Note proposes that courts differentiate between one-time event
bankruptcies and structurally imbalanced bankruptcies to evaluate the
creditor notice, insolvency, and good faith provisions. It suggests that
utilization of nonessential assets should be considered in the insolvency and
good faith analyses. Finally, this Note offers heuristics and examples to
provide texture for the analysis of future filings.
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INTRODUCTION
Municipalities face increasing budgetary pressures for reasons including
legacy pension and health care obligations, lagging revenue stemming from
the “Great Recession,” and unanticipated performance of financial
instruments.1 In the second quarter of 2014, the size of the U.S. municipal
bond market was $3.66 trillion.2 In 2013, unfunded pension and health care
liabilities for the largest sixty-one municipalities alone were $217 billion.3
Municipalities cannot manipulate the currency that denominates their debt
to facilitate repayment—a key tool available to sovereigns, like the federal
government, that control their own currency. Many municipalities also face
state law constraints during efforts to raise taxes and assessments—revenue
Given these limitations,
that is the lifeblood of a municipality.4
municipalities at some point have to make difficult choices on the services
they provide, attempt to adjust their debts, or both.5
Municipalities take unique paths to reach dire straits, but generally,
financial distress manifests itself in one of two ways—either a one-time
event or a significant structural imbalance—that renders the municipality
insolvent.6 One-time events, including a large adverse civil judgment,7
fraudulent behavior,8 or investment pool losses,9 can cause “acute and
immediate” financial crisis10 where a disproportionate financial stress
renders insolvent an otherwise financially sound municipality. At the other
end of the spectrum are municipalities that experience protracted structural
imbalances from a combination of issues that may include shrinking
population, loss of tax base, legacy pension costs, unfunded health care
costs, and infrastructure costs.11
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can
Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
365, 366–68 (2011).
2. SIFMA, US BOND MARKET ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING (2014), available at
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx.
3. See infra note 109.
4. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1120–22 (2014) (describing reductions in police forces, decisions not to provide
services to certain segments of a municipality, and sales of buildings and land). See also In
re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112–21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (describing Detroit’s
failing public services and choices the city made prior to petitioning for bankruptcy).
6. JOHN KNOX & MARC LEVINSON, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: AVOIDING AND USING
CHAPTER 9 IN TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 3–4 (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 2009),
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/1736.pdf.
7. See, e.g., In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 161, 164 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011)
(describing a $4 million judgment against a county with a $9.3 million yearly budget).
8. See, e.g., In re Jefferson Cnty, 474 B.R. 228, 284–85 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012)
(describing fraudulent behavior that contributed to massive debt from the county’s sewer
reconstruction contracts).
9. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179–80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)
(describing $524 million in losses from risky investments that resulted in large budget
deficits).
10. See id.
11. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112–16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013);
In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 779–81 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
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Detroit is a prime example of such structural imbalances.12 Economic
decline, population loss, and other structural factors reduced Detroit’s tax
base.13 The per capita tax burden on residents and businesses increased
significantly while overall revenue collection declined due to population
loss, deindustrialization, fiscal mismanagement, and other structural
problems, leaving the city struggling to provide basic services for residents
and businesses.14 In 2013, debt service obligations accounted for 42.5
percent of Detroit’s yearly revenue.15 By 2017, debt service obligations are
projected to rise to 65 percent of city revenues.16
Regardless of a municipality’s path to financial trouble, states are
constitutionally prohibited from adjusting a municipality’s contracts,
leaving Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as the sole mechanism a
municipality can utilize for debt adjustment.17 Specifically, Chapter 9
allows municipalities to restructure their debts under protection of the
Bankruptcy Code.18 To file for Chapter 9 protection, the debtor must be a
municipality that is specifically authorized by the state to be a debtor.19
Additionally, the municipality must demonstrate insolvency and the desire
to adjust its debts.20
A federal bankruptcy court analyzes the petition at the eligibility phase
and approves an eligible debtor’s debt adjustment plan if it meets all Code
confirmation criteria.21 Many questions arise when analyzing eligibility: Is
the entity actually a municipality that is specifically authorized to file? Is
the debtor insolvent as defined in the Code? Does the municipality have
nonessential (e.g., art, equivalent monetary instruments, mineral reserves,
etc.) or potential assets (e.g., tax increases, assessments, insurance policies,
etc.), and did the municipality utilize those resources? Has the municipality
acted in good faith? For example, in In re City of Detroit,22 the city owned
several paintings each worth over $100 million as part of a 65,000 piece
collection valued in the billions.23 Should Detroit be forced to liquidate
some or all of the art to pay creditors, including bondholders and
pensioners? Should those nonessential and cash convertible assets be
utilized in the insolvency calculation? Or should they be considered in the
12. See generally Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to
Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code at 2, Detroit, 504 B.R 97 (July 18, 2013) (No. 1353846) [hereinafter Detroit Memorandum].
13. See id.
14. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1139. Basic services can include infrastructure
(water, sewer, and roads), education, and safety services (fire, police, and emergency
medical services). Id.
15. Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3.
16. Id.
17. See infra Part I.C.1. The U.S. Constitution forbids states from enacting any “law
impairing the obligation of contract.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012); see infra Part I.C.4.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).
21. See John P. McNicholas, An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 J.
PAYMENT SYS. L. 606, 606–07 (2006).
22. 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
23. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
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good faith analysis? Finally, should these answers be the same if the
bankruptcy is not a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, like Detroit, but
rather a municipality that suffered from a detrimental one-time event, such
as a disproportionately large judgment against a municipal authority?24
Municipal bankruptcy involves many competing interests, from creditors,
including secured and unsecured bondholders, retirees, contractors, and
civil judgment holders, to city residents, who have basic service needs.25
Some creditors are former employees and also citizens of the
municipality—they worked for the municipality and expect their pensions
and health care benefits as a form of deferred compensation.26 A careful
balancing is required to ensure that a municipality can provide its residents
with basic services such as fire protection, clean water, garbage removal,
police protection, and functioning schools, while still protecting creditors’
rights. After all, “[c]ities cannot go out of business.”27 Bankruptcy courts
have the unenviable task of balancing these competing interests to avoid the
moral hazards that can possibly arise.28
This Note provides an updated framework for evaluating key portions of
the Chapter 9 bankruptcy process. Part I identifies what a municipality is,
the services a municipality provides to its residents, and how a municipality
is financed. Part I also evaluates the reasons that municipalities become
financially troubled and then pivots to outlining the fundamental framework
of Chapter 9, the federal Municipal Bankruptcy Code.
Part II outlines the conflicting judicial interpretations of Chapter 9
bankruptcy factors, describing the differences between a one-time event
bankruptcy and a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy. Next, it explains the
factors that are particularly relevant in Chapter 9 filings, and how they
relate to each other when determining whether creditors had notice, whether
the municipality was actually insolvent, how the municipality utilized any
nonessential or potential assets, and whether the municipality acted in good
faith throughout the bankruptcy process. Part II then analyzes the different,
and sometimes conflicting, approaches bankruptcy courts have applied
when deciding whether a municipality has demonstrated each factor.
Part III proposes a new multipart test for analyzing whether a
municipality meets the statutory conditions required for Chapter 9
municipal bankruptcy. The test tailors four factors to apply to the two main

24. See, e.g., In re McCurtain Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *6
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2007) (describing the low-income community’s financial
capacity and holding that the failure to generate revenue from additional tax assessments on
residents was not evidence of bad faith).
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1123–24.
27. In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (stating that the
purpose of Chapter 9 is to enable a financially distressed city to continue to provide essential
services while it works out a plan to adjust its debts). Id.
28. As used here, “moral hazard” may be defined as “the tendency of debtors to prefer to
devote their resources to their own interests instead of repaying their debts.” Michael W.
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426 (1993).
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types of municipal bankruptcy—one-time event bankruptcies and
significant long-term structural imbalance bankruptcies. The factors weigh
(1) whether creditors had notice of specific authorization; (2) whether the
petition is prospective or current; (3) the pre-petition utilization of available
assets; and (4) good faith at the petition and confirmation phases.
I. A “MUNICIPALITY”: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT PROVIDES,
HOW IT IS FINANCED, AND HOW IT LANDS IN FISCAL TROUBLE
Part I provides an overview of a municipality, including what a
municipality is, what it does, and the constraints it faces in operating. Part
I.A examines the statutory definition of “municipality” in Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code and reviews how bankruptcy courts implement the
definition when evaluating whether an entity is in fact a municipality as
defined in the Code. Part I.B. details the services that a municipality
provides to its residents and outlines the methods—both traditional and
recent—that municipalities use to finance their operations, and it examines
the types of assets that a municipality may possess. Part I.B also analyzes
the budgetary constraints and financial stressors that municipalities often
face. Finally, Part I.C provides an overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
A. What Is a “Municipality”?
The dictionary defines “municipality” as “a primarily urban political unit
having corporate status and usually powers of self-government,”29 and
common usage evinces thoughts of a city, county, or town. But the term
municipality has a much wider definition in the Chapter 9 context.30 The
Bankruptcy Code defines “municipality” as a “political subdivision or
public agency or instrumentality of a State.”31 This section analyzes how
different entities are treated under the Bankruptcy Code’s municipal
provisions.
1. Clear Examples of a Municipality: Counties and Cities
Cities are generally considered municipalities under Chapter 9, and
creditors typically do not challenge a city’s status as a municipality. For
example, in Detroit, the parties stipulated that Detroit was a municipality,
which the court accepted.32 Similarly, in In re City of Stockton,33 the

29. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 817 (11th ed. 2003).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02 (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014) (stating that the definition of municipality
was intended to “broaden the applicability” of Chapter 9); see also In re Barnwell Cnty.
Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 858–59 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012) (“[T]he Court construes broadly
§ 109(c)’s eligibility requirements.”).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012).
32. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 129 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
33. 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
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objectors to Stockton’s Chapter 9 eligibility conceded that Stockton was a
“municipality” under Chapter 9.34
Counties also are generally considered municipalities, and state charter
definitions of “county” fit squarely within Chapter 9’s definition of
“municipality.”35 For instance, in Idaho, the state charter defines “county”
as a “body politic of the state,” making Boise County a political subdivision
of the state and thus a municipality.36 Likewise, in In re County of
Orange,37 the court stated “[c]learly, the County is a municipality under the
Code,”38 noting that because Orange County was created by the State of
California and had express sovereign powers, including taxation and the
ability to sue and be sued, it was “by definition a municipality.”39 In In re
Jefferson County,40 it was apparently so clear that Jefferson County was a
municipality for purposes of Chapter 9 that the court assumed that the
county was a municipality without formally addressing the question.41
2. Special Purpose Entities: Is It a “Municipality”?
Under Chapter 9, municipalities may also include housing authorities,
school districts, and toll roads.42 For example, a bankruptcy court held that
a hospital qualified as a municipality and was an “instrumentality of the
state” because the city council essentially controlled the hospital’s budget
and board of directors.43 In another case, a bankruptcy court held that a
transit district—created under state-enabling statutes and “bearing many
strong aspects of local authority and equally strong aspects of state
authority”—was a hybrid organization that qualified as a municipality as
defined by Chapter 9.44
Public control is also relevant when distinguishing between private and
public agencies, as can be the case with service-providing authorities.45 In
Ex parte York County Natural Gas Authority,46 the court held that the
power granted by the state authorizing legislation—empowering the
municipality to “purchase, lease . . . maintain and operate natural gas
distribution systems” and conferring a full set of management powers and
duties, as well as the power to issue revenue bonds—was sufficient to
qualify the entity as a public agency under Chapter 9’s municipality
34. See id. at 783.
35. See In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 167 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011).
36. Id.
37. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
38. Id. at 600.
39. Id. at 600 n.11.
40. 474 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
41. Id.
42. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02.
43. See In re Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 859–60 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012).
44. In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court concluded that the state
statutes did not authorize the municipality for Chapter 9 relief. See id. at 96–98.
45. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 784 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
46. 238 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.S.C. 1965), modified on other grounds by Mozingo v. York
Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 352 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1965).
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definition.47 The court stated that “‘[t]he legal test between a private or
public authority or agency is whether the authority or agency is subject to
control by public authority, state or municipal.’”48
Courts have clarified that whether an entity is a municipality depends not
only on the “level of State control over the entity’s organization and
operations, but also the intent of the State that created it.”49 A complete
absence of public control likely indicates that the entity is not a Chapter 9
municipality.50 For example, in In re Ellicott School Building Authority,51
the court held that a school building authority created under a nonprofit
corporation act, which had no taxing or assessment authority and issued
revenue bonds that disclosed no public control and were serviced solely
with proceeds from school district rent, was not a municipality.52 The court
noted that “no governmental entity exercises any right of control” over the
building agency, and thus it was not a Chapter 9 municipality.53
While lack of public control is strong evidence of against municipality
status, the existence of public control does not automatically indicate a
municipality.54 If the control is more akin to regulatory control, as, for
example, often exhibited in the gambling, energy, and taxi industries, then
the entity is not a municipality.55
Finally, courts consider the state’s statutory classification of an entity.56
If a state designates and treats an entity as an instrumentality of the state,
the court is likely to find the state’s designation heavily persuasive due to
the underlying state control issues.57 In In re Sullivan County Regional
Refuse Disposal District,58 the court gave significant deference to how the
refuse disposal district was classified under state law.59 Similarly, in
Orange County, when the Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP)
petitioned for Chapter 9 along with the county itself, the court held that
OCIP was not a municipality.60 First, the court questioned whether OCIP
was a “political subdivision,” and it found that the investment pool had
“neither sovereign power delegated to it by the State of California, nor [did]
it have by its existence some inherent sovereign power to act.”61 Second, it
held that OCIP was not a public agency, finding that the pool “was not
47. Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 784 (quoting York Cnty. Natural Gas Auth.,
238 F. Supp. at 966).
48. York Cnty. Natural Gas Auth., 238 F. Supp. at 976.
49. Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 784.
50. See id.
51. 150 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
52. See Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 785–86.
53. Id. at 786.
54. Id. at 785.
55. Id.
56. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02.
57. See In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 73.
60. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602–03 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
61. Id. at 602.
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organized for the purpose of maintaining or operating a revenue producing
enterprise” and did not issue bonds of any type.62 Third, the court held that
OCIP was not an instrumentality of the state, because OCIP did not share
the “characteristics and objectives” of the entities described in the previous
versions of the Code.63
In summary, Congress intended, and courts apply, a relatively broad
definition of municipality. The Chapter 9 definition of municipality
encompasses political subdivisions including counties, cities, and towns,
and it also includes entities such as toll roads, hospitals, and housing
authorities if the entity satisfies a three-part analysis: (1) whether the entity
has “powers typically associated with sovereignty,” (2) “whether the entity
has a public purpose and the level of [state] control” over its activities, and
(3) the state’s designation of the entity.64
B. Factors Giving Rise to Insolvency
A municipality may provide a broad range of services based on the
statutory authorization in the state. Part I.B.1 outlines the type of services
that a municipality provides and how the municipality finances the services
it provides. Then, Part I.B.2 identifies typical reasons that a municipality
enters into fiscal duress.
1. What Municipalities Provide and How They Finance It
Municipalities may provide very broad or relatively narrow services
depending on the power granted by the state.65 A typical city or county
provides basic services to its residents and businesses—from safety services
like fire, police, and emergency medical services to infrastructure, which
may include water, sewer, roads, and transportation systems.66 Other
municipalities may provide a single narrow service—either public housing,
or transportation systems, or health care.67
Municipalities have the right to acquire property, including real property
and personal property, for their use and benefit.68 The power to hold, sell,
and convey property is often expressed in statutory or charter provisions,
although the power to purchase and possess land and chattel is a common

62. Id.
63. Id. at 603. The court noted that the definition of “municipality” in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(40) did not explain the limits of the broad statutory language, whereas earlier code
versions provided a list of entities. Id. at 601–02. The court chose not to erode prior
bankruptcy law, absent a clear contrary directive from Congress. Id. at 602.
64. See supra notes 32–63; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02 (citing
In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 789 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010)).
65. See, e.g., Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 9–10. Detroit has “comprehensive
home rule power under the State Constitution of 1963 . . . the Home Rule City Act and the
2012 [City] Charter . . . subject to the limitations on the exercise of that power contained in
the Constitution, the Charter or applicable Michigan statute.” Id. at 9.
66. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1139.
67. See supra Part I.A.2.
68. See 10 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 28:2 (3d ed. 2014).
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law power held by municipalities.69 Municipalities may own “essential
assets,” i.e., those directly related to providing services, such as government
buildings, vehicles, supplies, and infrastructure systems.70 Municipalities
may also own nonessential assets, which this Note defines as assets that the
municipality owns but are not critical to providing public services.
Nonessential assets may include art, equivalent monetary instruments,
mineral reserves, and seized, abandoned, or unused property.71 For
example, a municipality may have art in a museum, a warehouse, or in city
buildings.72 It could have equivalent monetary reserves—such as coin or
gold reserves—that have been in a municipal vault for years, which are
convertible to cash. Or a municipality may have extractible mineral
reserves—such as oil, diamonds, or precious metals—on or beneath public
lands.73 Finally, a municipality may own property that it has seized due to
tax defaults, or that it has abandoned as no longer functional.74
Municipalities, whether they provide comprehensive or limited services,
have to generate sufficient funding to pay for the public services they
provide.75 Municipalities have myriad methods to generate revenue
depending on their authorizing statutes, but generally the methods fall into
several broad categories, including taxes,76 municipal bonds,77 trade
credit,78 and deferred debt.79
Municipalities use taxes as a mechanism to raise revenue for operations.
The state, possessing the power to tax, may confer or delegate taxing power
69. See id.
70. See David S. Kupetz, Standards for Confirming a Chapter 9 Plan of Debt
Adjustment: Incorporating and Diverging from Chapter 11 Plan Standards, 32 CAL.
BANKR. J. 289, 290–91 (2012) (stating that services and programs involving “public safety,
health, and welfare are likely to be viewed as essential”). Kupetz suggests that a program or
service is likely to be deemed essential when the program or service: (1) is legally
mandated; (2) contributes to the protection of health and safety or mitigates risk;
(3) contributes to preservation of essential assets; or (4) is necessary to maintain quality of
life and the “negative impact of eliminating or reducing such programs and services can be
demonstrated and is significant.” Id.
71. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); City of
Shreveport v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 76 (1939). See also McConnell & Picker, supra note 28, at
432, 462–63 (discussing pre-Bankruptcy Code historical division of municipal property into
proprietary versus non-proprietary, where proprietary property was “held in [the
municipality’s] own right for profit or a source of revenue, not charged with any public trust
or use.”). Examples of proprietary property included unused vacant lots or property seized
by the municipality.
72. See generally Detroit, 504 B.R. 97.
73. See 47 A.L.R.3d 19 (1973); see, e.g., Kahn, 194 La. at 76 (1939). Municipalities
may also lease oil and mineral rights pursuant to the rights and restrictions in their charter
and legal restrictions.
74. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 28, at 432 n.29–30.
75. See 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2019 (2014).
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE
LAW, BANKRUPTCY, AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2014), available at
http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_B
ONDS.pdf.
78. See generally 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2016.
79. See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
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to a municipality.80 Taxing power is generally granted to a municipality
and is essential to its existence.81 Municipalities may levy various types of
taxes depending on their statutory grant from the state, but general
municipal taxes include income, transaction, and occupancy tax.82 Other
taxes may include franchise, property, convention, and tourism taxes.83
Although taxes are a primary way that municipalities generate funds,
they also issue bonds to finance investments and expenditures.84 In the
context of municipal finance, two types of bonds—general obligation bonds
and special revenue bonds—are most prevalent.85 General obligation bonds
are sold to raise capital, where the principal and interest payments are
backed by the “irrevocabl[e] pledge[]” of the “full faith, credit, and
resources” of the city.86 The city is obligated in “good faith [to] use its
resources as may be authorized or required by law” to ensure prompt
payment.87
General obligation bonds can be constructed as unlimited tax general
obligation bonds (UTGOs), limited tax general obligation bonds (LTGOs),
and general obligation bonds payable from the issuer’s general fund
(GFGOs).88 GFGOs have no specific pledge of taxing power, LTGOs are
secured by a limited property tax, and UTGOs are secured by unlimited
property taxes.89 However, voter approval is generally required to issue
unlimited tax obligations and sometimes is required for limited tax
obligations.90
While general obligations are enforceable under state law, the
commitment is “made against the backdrop of federal bankruptcy law,”91
and if bankruptcy is successfully invoked, federal bankruptcy law preempts
state law.92 Additionally, although secured by the “full faith and credit” of
the issuing municipality, general obligation bonds are unsecured for the
purposes of Chapter 9.93 If the issuing municipality files a Chapter 9
petition, the abilities of creditors to enforce their rights is prevented by the

80. See 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2219.
81. See id.
82. See id. § 2260.
83. See id. For example, Detroit levies multiple taxes including a 2.0 percent business
income tax, a 2.4 percent resident income tax, a 68.95 millage property tax, a 5 percent
utility user’s tax, and a 10.9 percent casino user’s tax. See infra notes 245–49 and
accompanying text.
84. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 77.
85. See SEC, MUNICIPAL BONDS: UNDERSTANDING CREDIT RISK 1–2 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipalbondsbulletin.pdf.
86. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 77, at 2.
87. Id. (emphasis removed).
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id.
91. Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035,
1047 (1997). Thus, the city’s pledge can be modified or discharged using a successful
Chapter 9 petition.
92. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
93. Kordana, supra note 91, at 1048.
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automatic stay provisions,94 and their ability to receive future payments is
contingent on the debtor’s confirmation plan.95
Revenue bonds are the second main source of municipal borrowing.
Revenue bonds are backed by a revenue stream derived from a specific
project, source, or operation.96 The Bankruptcy Code provides that special
revenues can be derived from (A) project or system ownership or operation;
(B) special excise taxes on specific transactions; (C) incremental tax
receipts from the area benefited from the financing; (D) other revenues
from particular debtor functions; or (E) specific taxes levied for project
finance.97 Special revenues are exempt from the § 922(d) automatic stay
provisions, requiring the municipality to continue providing the revenue
stream to the creditor.98
Municipalities also contract with suppliers, contractors, and individuals
to provide the materials and services that they need for operations.99 Trade
creditor agreements allow the municipality to receive goods and services
and then pay for those goods and services in a specified amount of time.100
A trade creditor can be a paper supplier, building contractor, or asphalt
provider. Municipalities have a great deal of flexibility when dealing with
trade creditors in bankruptcy.101 For example, a municipality is free to
determine whether it will pay pre-petition claims without bankruptcy court
approval.102 In Jefferson County, the commissioners decided to pay
undisputed trade debts as they became due.103 While trade creditors may
fare reasonably well in city and county bankruptcy, they do not fare as well
when the municipality is a special purpose municipality.104 Trade creditors
as a group are often numerous and may have widely varying debts, and
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922(a) (2012). The automatic stay provisions prevent a creditor
from the commencement or continuance of any proceeding seeking to enforce a claim
against the debtor, essentially putting a creditor’s efforts on hold. See 11 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).
However, special revenues are exempt from the automatic stay. Id. § 922(d).
95. See Kordana, supra note 91, at 1048.
96. See SEC, supra note 85, at 2.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2).
98. Id. § 922(d). Chapter 9’s only limitation on the special revenue stream is that the
revenues are subject to the “necessary operating expenses” of the project or system. See id. §
928(b).
99. See David S. Kupetz, Understanding the Unique Factors of Chapter 9 Municipal
Bankruptcies, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY:
LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING
MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES (2014) [hereinafter
REPRESENTING CREDITORS], available at 2014 WL 4785315, at *4.
100. See id.
101. Jay Bender, New Developments, New Issues for Creditors and Debtors in Chapter 9
Bankruptcy Cases, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL
4785314, at *6 (municipalities may choose to pay pre-petition trade claims without court
approval).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. When the debtor is a special purpose municipality, it is often more critical to
conserve cash to fund the continued operation of that special purpose during bankruptcy. Id.
Cities and counties, on the other hand, need to continue operating a series of services that
may not be provided by the creditor if payments are withheld. Id.
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therefore, negotiations may be difficult without a representative creditor.105
Regardless, Chapter 9’s automatic stay still enjoins trade creditors from
enforcing their contractual rights after a municipality petitions for
bankruptcy, and can land them in a class of unsecured creditors in a Chapter
9 proceeding.106
Municipality employees with defined pensions and health care benefits
are creditors of a municipality.107 Like trade creditors, pensioners generally
have numerous claimants without a specific representative to collectively
represent the group.108 Recently, a Pew Charitable Trust study of sixty-one
large cities in the United States found that those cities have $217 billion in
unfunded pension and health care liabilities.109 The gap, however, was
unevenly distributed, with only 40 percent of the cities maintaining funding
of at least 80 percent, and four of the cities exhibiting funding levels at or
below 50 percent.110
2. The Current Landscape: Municipal Stressors
Municipal financial stressors at a micro-level are unique to each
municipality—a natural result arising from myriad factors including state
and local fiscal policy, geography, educational systems, population flow,
and infrastructural demands.111 However, at a macro-level the stressors can
be grouped into general issues facing each municipality. Generally, a
municipality is rendered insolvent either by a disproportionate one-time
financial event or a significant structural financial imbalance that occurs
over a period of time.112
a. One-Time Financial Event Stressors
One-time events can cause an “acute and immediate” financial crisis,
where the disproportionate financial stress renders insolvent an otherwise
seemingly solvent municipality.113 A one-time event can manifest itself in
multiple forms based on the specific circumstances of a municipality. For
instance, a large adverse civil judgment may be so substantial in relation to

105. See id.
106. See id. at *9.
107. See Kupetz, supra note 99, at *2.
108. See Bender, supra note 101, at *11. While pensioners are generally represented by
unions during their employment, when they retire, they no longer are represented by the
union. Unions can intercede on behalf of the pensioners, but they need to be granted
authority by the pensioners to negotiate a deal. See id. at *6.
109. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES: SHORTFALLS IN FUNDING
FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org
/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/Pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf (basing the
results off data from the largest city in each state and every city with a population over
500,000).
110. See id. at 7, 13.
111. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
113. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
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a municipality’s budget that it cannot make currently due payments.114
Other one-time circumstances include fraudulent behavior, where once
discovered causes an immediate financial stress that prevents a municipality
from paying its bills,115 and investment pool losses, where a municipality
makes unfortunate investment decisions that lead to disproportionately
large losses in relation to the municipality’s budget.116
For example, Orange County entered dire fiscal straits in 1991 due to
investment pool losses triggered by investments that were “risky, volatile,
and lacked liquidity.”117 The strategy involved short-term borrowing to
purchase long-term securities, constructed around a bet that interest rates
would remain low.118 When short-term rates rose, the value of the
investment portfolio dropped while, simultaneously, the creditors called the
short-term debt, causing losses from the early liquidation of the
collateral.119 The treasurer was essentially gambling that interest rates
would not rise, and when that bet failed, the investment portfolio
collapsed.120
Financial fraud on the part of public employees, their agents, or both, can
rapidly deteriorate a municipality’s finances and lead to a one-time event
bankruptcy.121 The most egregious recent example of this was Jefferson
County, Alabama, where a special revenue warrant structure was used to
finance an updated sewer system, but many of the agreements were
obtained as a result of bribery and fraud committed by county
employees.122
While the above examples are hardly comprehensive, the basic concept
encompasses any specific circumstance that causes a financial shock that
directly impacts solvency, as compared to a structurally imbalanced
insolvency, which manifests itself over a significant period of time due to
multiple factors.
b. Structurally Imbalanced Municipality Liabilities
At the other end of the spectrum, municipalities experience protracted
structural imbalances from a combination of issues. This section describes
legacy pension and health care costs, analyzes deindustrialization and the
corresponding effects on a municipality, outlines reduced tax revenue, and
reviews poor fiscal mismanagement.123

114. See, e.g., In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 163 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011).
115. See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 284–85 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
116. See Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. at 179–80.
117. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
118. See id. at 597–98. The investment was set up as a “reverse repo,” where the county
“borrowed” by selling a security with an agreement to purchase the security in a short period
of time, essentially “leveraging” their portfolio. Id. at 598 n.4.
119. See id. at 598.
120. See id.
121. See generally In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
122. See id. at 239–40.
123. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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i. Public Pensions and Health Care
Public pensions remain a major and growing stressor to municipal
budgets, as the promise of deferred benefits became politically popular124
and life expectancy concurrently increased.125 Public unions became
popular in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when municipal governments
increasingly authorized unionization.126 Between 1960 and 2010, life
expectancy leaped from 69.7 years to 78.7 years.127 Unlike their private
sector counterparts that are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974128 (ERISA), public pensions are not regulated by
federal law nor are they protected by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Although subject to state level controls,
Corporation (PBGC).129
municipalities operate with significant freedom to authorize and implement
funding methods and policies.130 In previous years, negotiations with
unions often resulted in generous deferred benefit packages that combined
politically palpable promises involving less short term budgetary impact
with a “less-than-rigid” fiscal approach to paying those deferred benefits.131
For example, in Stockton, California, the police pension plan allows
officers to retire at age 50 with pensions amounting to up to 90 percent of
their salary, including yearly cost of living adjustments.132
ii. Deindustrialization
Deindustrialization is common to many cities and counties that
experience fiscal difficulties and is often an underlying cause of
bankruptcy.133 Cities that were constructed around a predominant industrial
employer that has since left or significantly changed experience a vacuum
of jobs and tax revenue.134 Older cities on the West Coast, previously
supported by military bases, experienced the loss of a main employer when
that base was decommissioned.135 Several of the recent California Chapter
9 petitions were made by cities with origins as commercial ports and
military bases.136 San Bernardino was home to Norton Air Force Base, a
124. See, e.g., Philip Greenspun, History of Public Employee Unions, PHILIP
GREENSPUN’S WEBLOG (Sept. 7, 2009), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/philg/2009/09/07
/history-of-public-employee-unions/.
125. See, e.g., Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
126. See Greenspun, supra note 124.
127. See Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010, supra note 125.
128. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461
(2012) and scattered section of 26 U.S.C.).
129. See Ellman & Merritt, supra note 1, at 368.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Calif., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30. 2014, 8:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/judge-approvesbankruptcy-exit-for-stockton-calif/?_r=0.
133. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 1128–34.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1134–35.
136. See id. at 1134.
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major logistics and freight transport facility, for fifty-three years.137
Stockton, a commercial port, also housed a Naval Reserve Center for the
duration of the Cold War, until decommissioning in 1996.138 And Vallejo
developed around Mare Island Naval base—an employer of 50,000 workers
in World War II—that eventually was also decommissioned in 1996.139 In
the Midwest, municipalities recorded significant population decreases as
industrial output declined and people shifted to the suburbs, different parts
of the country, and overseas.140 Deindustrialization can lead directly and
indirectly to reduced tax revenue.141
iii. Reduced Tax Revenue
A city’s tax revenue is a variable revenue stream that can change due to
macro-level effects, such as a financial recession, or local effects including
deindustrialization, population loss, and the resultant reduced property
values.142 After the “Great Recession” in 2008–2009, the remnants of the
financial crisis caused the 112 largest U.S. cities to experience per capita
revenue reductions of 5 percent between 2007 and 2011.143 Concurrently,
average real per capita expenditures were 2.6 percent higher in 2011 than
2007.144
City by city, the effect can be more dramatic—for example, Detroit’s
income tax revenues declined 30 percent between 2002 and 2013, while
property tax revenues declined 10 percent between 2012 and 2013 alone.145
iv. Fiscal (Mis)management
Fiscal mismanagement can also precipitate financial problems, either in
conjunction with other financial stressors or on its own.146 Fiscal
mismanagement can be related to collective bargaining agreements
discussed above, or it can be related to other bad contracts, financial
investments, or infrastructure costs.147 For instance, some municipalities
utilize interest-rate swap agreements to hedge against higher interest

137. See id. at 1134–35.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See generally Michael J. Minkus, Fighting Uncertainty: Municipal Partnerships
with Redevelopment Agencies Can Mitigate Uncertainty to Encourage Brownfield
Redevelopment, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 272 (2007).
141. See id. at 299 n.221 (deindustrialization may “leav[e] communities with withering
infrastructures and bereft of tax revenue” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. See generally Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12.
143. Newly Released Data Show Long-Lasting Impact of the Great Recession on Cities,
PR NEWSWIRE, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newly-released-data-show-longlasting-impact-of-the-great-recession-on-cities-259268141.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
144. Id.
145. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
146. See, e.g., In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 235–45 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
147. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
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rates.148 Swaps are effective hedges against high interest rates, but some
critics worry that elected officials do not have a full understanding of swap
products and their ramifications when compared to their investment banker
counterparties.149 The swap agreement is generally arranged so the
municipality exchanges its floating interest rate for a fixed interest rate.150
Municipalities enter the agreements because floating rates are lower than
fixed rate debt.151 When rates fall and stay low—as has been the case in the
United States since 2008—the swaps can cost municipalities significant
money.152 The counterpoint is that municipalities benefitted when rates
turned in their favor, and with an effective hedging technique, the swaps
can be advantageous to municipal borrowers.153
Fraudulent behavior or risky financial investments, as discussed in the
one-time event bankruptcies of Orange County and Jefferson County,154
can be part of the equation in structurally imbalanced bankruptcies as well.
When fraudulent behavior or risky investments are present in a structurally
imbalanced bankruptcy, they simply compound an already bleak financial
condition. Regardless of how a municipality’s financial trouble arises, the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism to adjust its debts.
C. The Bankruptcy Code: An Overview
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is separated into chapters which outline
general provisions (Chapter 1), relate to case administration (Chapter 3),
provide provisions dealing with the creditors, debtor, and estate (Chapter 5),
as well as adjustment of a municipality’s debts (Chapter 9) and business
reorganization (Chapter 11).155 Chapter 9 excludes all provisions of the
Code except Chapter 1 and Chapter 9, although § 901 does invoke
particular Code sections in Chapters 3, 5, and 11.156
Chapter 9 is the focus of Parts II and III.
1. Historical Underpinnings and Constitutional Limits
Municipal bankruptcy legislation in the United States is a relatively new
phenomenon, originating in the 1930s in response to rapidly deteriorating
148. Interest-rate swaps trade a stream of interest payments for payments based on a fixed
principal. Generally, a floating interest rate is traded for a fixed interest rate to hedge risk.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (10th ed. 2014).
149. Aaron Lucchetti, Interest-Rate Deals Sting Cities, States, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703775504575135930211329798.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. For example, if a municipality swapped a variable interest rate of 6 percent
for a fixed interest rate of 8 percent, and the variable interest rate then goes down to 3.5
percent, the municipality is “losing” 4.5 percent on each payment relative to what it would
have paid without the swap.
153. See id.
154. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
155. 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC.
§ 11:1 (3d. 2014).
156. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(e), 901 (2012).

2722

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

municipal finances during the Great Depression.157 Prior to federal
municipal bankruptcy law, a creditor’s remedy was generally limited to a
mandamus order to raise taxes, which often had deleterious effects because
of the massive financial strain, resulting in defaulted assessments as tax
sales drove down property values and exacerbated tax delinquency.158
States, when they ratified the Constitution, granted bankruptcy regulatory
powers to the federal government, specifically providing Congress with the
power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.”159 The U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land”
and specifies that states shall be bound by federal law.160 Essentially, if the
federal government’s exercise of power is proper, federal law will preempt
any and all conflicting or inconsistent state law.161
Since the Municipal Bankruptcy Code’s inception, it has walked the
tenuous line between the federal powers and state sovereignty provided by
the Constitution.162 In 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement District,163 held that the 1934
municipal bankruptcy legislation unconstitutionally interfered with state
sovereignty.164 The Court expressed concern that if a federal bankruptcy
court could engage in readjustment of debt obligations of a state, or one of
its “political subdivisions,” that state would be “no longer free to manage
their own affairs,” and the material restriction of a state’s control over their
fiscal affairs was thus declared unconstitutional.165
In response to Ashton, Congress enacted, and the Supreme Court upheld
in United States v. Bekins,166 a revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act.167 In
Bekins, the Court noted Congress was “especially solicitous” to ensure that
the revised Act would “afford no ground for [constitutional] objection.”168
During the legislative process, the House Judiciary Committee Report

157. See Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current
Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 98 (2011).
158. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 45 (1938).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
160. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
161. Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER
9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES (Jo
Alice Darden ed., 2011), available at 2011 WL 5053640, at *4.
162. See Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
The Constitution expressly forbids states from enacting any “Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Concurrently, however, the Tenth Amendment
establishes limits on federal power by reserving the powers not delegated by the Constitution
to the states, thus preserving state sovereignty. Id. amend. X.
163. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
164. See id. at 532.
165. Id. at 531.
166. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
167. See id. at 54.
168. Id. at 50.
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stated the committee’s mindfulness of the Ashton holding, and its belief that
the Revised Act was in compliance with the Ashton holding, noting:
The bill here recommended for passage expressly avoids any restriction
on the powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of
their sovereign rights and duties. No interference with the fiscal or
governmental affairs of a political subdivision is permitted. The taxing
agency itself is the only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the
proposed legislation. No involuntary proceedings are allowable, and no
control or jurisdiction over that property and those revenues of the
petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is
conferred by the bill . . . . There is no hope for relief through statutes
enacted by the States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of
State laws impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief
must come from Congress, if at all. The committee [is] not prepared to
admit that the situation presents a legislative no-man’s land.169

The Senate Judiciary Committee adopted the House Committee Report.170
The Supreme Court, when upholding the constitutionality of the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act, noted that the statute was “carefully drawn so as not to
impinge on the sovereignty of the State,” and that the power is exercised
only when authorized by state law.171 The Court stated that the Tenth
Amendment “protected, and did not destroy, [a state’s] right to make
contracts and give consents.”172
2. The Municipal Bankruptcy Code Evolves
For forty years, the Municipal Bankruptcy Act remained largely
unchanged, until municipal financial developments in the 1970s, including
New York City’s financial crisis in 1976, prompted Congress to amend the
Municipal Bankruptcy Code.173 Before 1976, bankruptcy courts were
required to find that the adjustment plan was “for the best interests of the
creditors” and “fair and equitable” prior to confirmation.174 “Feasibility
was embedded into the ‘fair and equitable’ requirement,” and courts were
required to analyze projected expenditures and revenues, and make express
findings whether it was probable that after adjustment, the debtor could pay
the creditors’ claims.175 Courts understood that the “fair and equitable”
requirement meant that a municipality had to generally demonstrate a
balanced budget in a reasonable time period after adjustment
confirmation.176 The 1976 revisions expressly required a feasibility
determination but removed the fair and equitable requirement as redundant

169. Id. at 51.
170. See id. at 50.
171. See id. at 51.
172. See id. at 52.
173. See Heck, supra note 157, at 98 n.70.
174. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (citing Act
of June 28, 1940, ch. 438, 54 Stat. 667, 669–70 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 94-686, at 32 (1975)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
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with the best interests of creditors test.177 The best interest of creditors
requirement of § 943(b)(7) is often easy to establish because creditors often
have limited recourse outside of bankruptcy—they cannot propose a
payment plan, cannot convert proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation,
cannot appoint a trustee, and cannot force municipal asset sales.178
Generally, a creditor’s only recourse if it fears the Chapter 9 debtor’s plan is
to litigate for dismissal of the Chapter 9 petition.179 With limited leverage
and other options, creditors may accept a Chapter 9 plan to avoid other nonbankruptcy alternatives.180
In 1988, Congress updated the definition of “insolvency” to the current
cash flow definition, where the municipality must demonstrate its inability
to pay bills as they become due.181 Chapter 9’s definition is in contrast
with the Code’s definition of insolvency for non-municipality entities,
which employs a balance sheet approach.182 Congress updated Chapter 9’s
definition because a balance sheet methodology would result in most
municipalities’ liabilities exceeding the value of its nonexempt assets,
making many municipalities technically insolvent and thus eligible for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief.183
3. Bankruptcy Courts’ Interpretation of Congressional Purpose
The “purpose of chapter 9 is to temporarily protect a debtor from
collection actions so that it may establish a repayment plan with its
creditors.”184 Chapter 9 allows a municipality to preserve critical jobs and
keep the municipal debtor economically viable.185 The statute is arranged
to provide the debtor with a “breathing spell”—provided by the automatic
stay provisions under §§ 922(a) and 362(a)—to adjust its debt.186
However, the purpose of a Chapter 9 petition may not “simply be to buy
time or evade creditors.”187 Other bankruptcy courts have noted that the
court’s jurisdiction “should not be exercised lightly . . . in light of the
interplay between Congress’ bankruptcy power and the limitations on

177. See id. at 33–34. The “fair and equitable” requirement is now incorporated through
11 U.S.C. § 1129(10)(b) in certain situations. Id. at 34.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See 5 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 155, § 90:5.
182. The balance sheet approach is defined as a “financial condition such that the sum of
such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair valuation.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(32)(A) (2012).
183. See 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 155, § 17:8.
184. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(citing In re Hamilton Creek Metro. Dist., 143 F.3d 1381, 1386 (10th Cir. 1998)).
185. See Judith Elkin, A “Time Out” for Municipalities: The Recent Workings of Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES, supra note 162,
available at 2011 WL 5053638, at *1.
186. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (citing In re Cnty.
of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)).
187. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02.
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federal power under the Tenth Amendment,” and that access to Chapter 9
was designed to be an “intentionally difficult task.”188
4. Eligibility Requirements and Limits
Chapter 9 provides certain eligibility requirements to qualify for
protections at the petition phase.189 Section 109(c) provides that “an entity
may be a debtor under Chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity[:]
(1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by
State law . . . ; (3) is insolvent; [and] (4) desires to effect a plan to adjust
such debts.”190 Section 109 further provides that the debtor must either
(A) have obtained an agreement of creditors holding a majority in amount
of claims of each class, (B) have negotiated in good faith with creditors but
failed to obtain an agreement of the majority in amount of the claims of
each class, (C) be unable to negotiate with creditors because negotiation is
impracticable, or (D) reasonably believe that a creditor may attempt to
obtain a transfer that in avoidable under § 547.191 The petitioner bears the
burden of proving—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the entity
satisfies the eligibility criteria.192 Courts have held that § 109(c)’s
eligibility requirements should be “construed broadly” to promote the
underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code—that is, to provide
municipalities with the access to relief.193 The Bankruptcy Code requires
that a municipality’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition must be submitted in
good faith or the court may dismiss the petition altogether, denying any
relief to the municipality.194
Chapter 9 also provides that the debtor’s debt adjustment plan must
conform to multiple statutory provisions to be eligible for confirmation by
the court.195 The debtor remains in exclusive control over the proposed
plan, subject to the requirements of § 943 and to confirmation by the
court.196 However, the debtor carries the burden of proof for the
confirmation plan requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.197
188. In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 82 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1994); see also N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 264 (stating that eligibility
should be determined with a “jaded eye” due to dual sovereignty concerns).
189. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also id. § 547. Section 547 prevents transfer of property to or for the benefit
of the creditor when certain statutory conditions are met. Id.
192. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
193. In re Valley Health Sys., 383 B.R. 156, 163 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); see also In re
Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849, 858–59 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012); In re Pierce Cnty. Hous.
Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594,
601 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c). (“[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss the
petition if the debtor did not file the petition in good faith or if the petition does not meet the
[statutory requirements].”).
195. See id. § 943.
196. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 941.02.
197. Allan H. Ickowitz & Robert S. McWhorter, Understanding the Unique Challenges of
Chapter 9 Cases, in REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL
4785318, at *8.
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Section 943(b)(1) requires that the plan comply with Code provisions made
applicable by §§ 103(a) and 901(a). Section 901(a) makes applicable the
§ 1129(a)(3) requirement that the debt adjustment plan be proposed in good
faith.198 Section 943(b)(7) requires that the plan be in the “best interest” of
creditors, but courts have interpreted this simply to mean “better than the
Chapter 9 also requires that the plan must not
alternatives.”199
“discriminate unfairly” with respect to each class of claims and must be
“fair and equitable.”200 With respect to unsecured claims, § 1129(b)(2)
requires that either creditors receive a value equal to their claim or that no
creditor whose claims are junior to the claims of a class receives or retains
any property.201 However, case law shows varying interpretation of this
language, and many plans have been confirmed where various unsecured
bond obligations are classified separately from other unsecured creditors or
Courts allow separate
even other unsecured bond obligations.202
classification based on multiple criteria “including economic justifications,
settling [versus] non-settling creditors, or other appropriate grounds.”203 At
the confirmation stage, creditors can challenge the creditor class structure,
since confirmation requires a majority vote of each class of creditors, and
the classes may not be arbitrarily or coercively put together to provide
disproportionate benefits to certain classes.204
II. CONFLICTING AND INCONSISTENT CHAPTER 9
INTERPRETATIONS AND RESULTS
Part II outlines the conflicting judicial interpretations of Chapter 9
bankruptcy factors relating to eligibility for Chapter 9 relief and
confirmation of the Chapter 9 exit plan. The judicial interpretations create
uncertainty for municipalities and creditors alike.
In particular,
uncertainties in municipality treatment, asset usage, insolvency
calculations, and good faith analysis cause problems for both debtors and
creditors.205 Municipal debtors may face increased borrowing costs,
contagion issues,206 and uncertain eligibility for relief, while creditors have
limited recourse once the petition is accepted, as the municipal debtor can
spend and borrow without court approval and bind creditors to a confirmed
plan.207 With uncertain treatment on a case-by-case basis, there is room to
clarify the application of Chapter 9 by differentiating between one-time and
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 943(b)(1).
Ickowitz & McWhorter, supra note 197, at *14.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1); see Ickowitz & McWhorter, supra note 197, at *15.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2); see also Ickowitz & McWhorter, supra note 197, at *15.
See Ickowitz & McWhorter, supra note 197, at *16.
Id.
See Vazquez, supra note 161, at *6.
See generally Mark A. Cody, Creditors’ Rights in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, in
REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL 4785319, at *1–2.
206. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 816 (2014).
207. See In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 224–25 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1991).
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structurally imbalanced bankruptcies and providing context to key
outcome-determinative factors.
As discussed above, municipal bankruptcies generally fall into one of
two categories: one-time event bankruptcies or significant long-term
structural imbalance bankruptcies.208 Part II.A describes the difference
between the two types. The current bankruptcy precedent does not employ
guidelines to differentiate between the one-time event bankruptcy and longterm structural imbalance bankruptcy, leading to inconsistent and uncertain
results. Part II analyzes this tension.
When courts analyze the bankruptcy petition, they face several
challenges. First, municipalities have to receive specific authorization from
the state to file for bankruptcy.209 Currently, courts simply examine
whether a municipality is legally authorized to file.210 Municipalities with
uncertainty as to their legal ability to file leave creditors only with notice of
Chapter 9 generally, but without notice of whether a municipality is
actually a municipality and whether a specific municipality will be
authorized for a Chapter 9 filing. During significant financial stress, there
is much uncertainty as to how the state and municipality are going to act,
thus increasing credit risk and borrowing costs for solvent municipalities
because creditors are uncertain of Chapter 9 availability.211
Second, municipal bankruptcy petitions authorize either current or
prospective insolvency.212 Courts currently do not have a concrete rule for
how far into the future is too far for a prospective analysis and utilize an ad
hoc approach, which creates difficulties when determining eligibility.213
Additionally, municipalities may have assets that are not recognized under a
cash flow insolvency analysis but remain relevant to a municipality’s
financial position.214 Without the ability to force liquidation of assets, the
cash flow insolvency methodology potentially allows a city with significant
nonessential assets to be cash flow insolvent, and thus file for Chapter 9,
while maintaining the nonessential assets. Potential assets are another
issue. Municipalities generally have taxing and assessment powers, and the
question often arises in a bankruptcy proceeding—under the insolvency
calculation and the good faith analysis—whether that ability has been
reasonably deployed.215 Courts are split whether implementing taxes and
208. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
210. See id.; see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 900.02 (noting that the
statute requires specific authorization in capacity as a municipality, by name, by an
authorized government officer, and by a state empowered organization).
211. Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy
Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 903 n.87 (2002) (stating that the structure of a state
authorization system may affect borrowing costs).
212. See Elkin, supra note 185, at *3.
213. See, e.g., In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337–38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
214. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
215. Compare In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 83 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994) (failing to ever consider using taxing power is evidence of bad faith), with In
re McCurtain Mun. Auth., No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec.
4, 2007) (failing to assess citizens is not necessarily evidence of bad faith).
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assessments is evidence of bad faith, with corresponding implications in the
insolvency analysis.216 Differentiation of nonessential assets and potential
assets seems to have significant relevance to one-time event bankruptcy
since the debt is known and the question is simply whether the municipality
can reasonably pay its bills.
Finally, courts have to determine if a municipality’s petition and
subsequent behavior are in good faith. Good faith elements exist in every
aspect of the bankruptcy—from the situations and conditions leading up to
the petition, the accounting and projections, and the negotiations with the
proper parties.
A. Bankruptcy Types: The One-Offs and the Structurally Imbalanced
This section examines one-time event municipal bankruptcies and
structurally imbalanced municipal bankruptcies. It first outlines a typical
one-off bankruptcy which can be caused by one-time events such as a large
adverse civil judgment, fiscal mismanagement behavior, or investment pool
losses,217 using Jefferson County as an example. It then describes a typical
structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, using Detroit as an example.
1. One-Time Event Bankruptcy
A one-time event bankruptcy is caused by a disproportionate financial
stress occurring at a singular time that renders insolvent an otherwise
seemingly solvent municipality. As briefly outlined above, Jefferson
County, notorious for the second largest municipal bankruptcy filing in U.S.
history, exemplifies a quintessential one-time event bankruptcy. Its
bankruptcy petition resulted from the concurrence of invalidated state taxes
and crushing debt from the reconstruction of the County’s neglected sewer
system.218 The sewer debt was exacerbated by failed swap and interest rate
stabilization agreements that converted fixed interest rates to adjustable
rates while simultaneously utilizing a swap structure to control the
adjustable rates.219 The sewer system’s financing was obtained in part by
several agreements that involved bribery and fraud by multiple actors,
including construction contractors, municipal financiers, and investment
bankers.220 In evaluating the bankruptcy, the court suggested that the
“[c]ounty’s inhabitants are in the midst of a perfect financial storm brought
on by the convergence of prohibited, unethical and bad conduct by public
and private persons and entities all while some were supposedly under the
supervision of and regulation by state and federal agencies.”221 The perfect
storm of events that causes “acute and immediate” financial crisis is

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7–9.
See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
See id. at 237.
See id. at 239–40.
Id. at 240.
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characteristic of a one-time event bankruptcy, and that storm generally
happens with little prior notice.222
2. Structurally Imbalanced Bankruptcy
A structurally imbalanced bankruptcy is caused by protracted financial
stress created by structural conditions including shrinking population, loss
of tax base, legacy pension costs, unfunded health care costs, poor
Cities like Detroit, a
management, and infrastructure costs.223
quintessential structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, display the difficulties of
a municipality with significant financial imbalances emanating from
multiple sources manifesting themselves over a significant time period.224
Economic decline, population loss, and other structural factors reduced
Detroit’s tax base.225 Detroit’s population has dropped a dramatic 63
percent since the city’s mid-twentieth-century heyday, and has dropped 26
percent in the new millennium.226 The per capita tax burden on residents
and businesses has increased significantly, while the stresses from
population loss, deindustrialization, and fiscal mismanagement left the city
struggling to provide basic services—infrastructure (water, sewer, and
roads), education, and safety services (fire, police, and emergency medical
services)—for residents and businesses.227
Detroit had massive debts: $5.85 billion in special revenue bonds,228
$6.4 billion in post-employment benefit liabilities, $3.5 billion in unfunded
pension liabilities, $1.43 billion in pension certificates, $1.13 billion in
secured and unsecured general obligation bonds, $296 million in swap
liabilities, and $300 million in other liabilities.229 In 2013, debt service
obligations represented 42.5 percent of Detroit’s yearly revenue, and by
2017, debt service obligations are projected to rise to 65 percent of city
revenues.230
Detroit was unable to provide services to its constituents, a condition that
some commentators and bankruptcy judges refer to as “service delivery
insolvency.”231 Detroit has 78,000 abandoned or blighted structures and
nearly 66,000 blighted lots.232 Half a century of economic difficulties and
222. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
223. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 112–21 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
224. See id.
225. See Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 24–25.
226. See Disclosure Statement with Respect to Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the
City of Detroit, Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014) (No. 13-53846) [hereinafter Detroit
Disclosure Statement], available at 2014 WL 834782, at *38.
227. See generally id.
228. The Bankruptcy Code defines special revenues inter alia as receipts derived from
specific projects, functions, or systems of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012).
229. Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2–3.
230. Id.
231. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788–91 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). Service
delivery insolvency examines the municipality’s ability to provide services at the “level and
quality that are required for the health, safety, and welfare of the community.” Id. at 789; see
also Anderson, supra note 5, at 1192–93.
232. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 120 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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mismanagement prevented Detroit from making critical investments,
resulting in critical city departments, including police, fire, emergency
medical services, being unable to adequately serve its population.233
Detroit’s violent crime rates were five times the national averages and the
case clearance rate234 is significantly below the national average.235
Detroit’s average response time for top priority crimes was 58 minutes,
over five times the national average.236 Forty percent of the city’s
streetlights do not function.237 In 2009, Detroit closed 210 of its 317 parks,
and it has announced an additional 50 park closings.238 The number of jobs
in the city has declined 50 percent—from approximately 735,000 jobs in
1970 to approximately 346,000 jobs in 2012.239 The unemployment rate
has swiftly risen, from 6.3 percent in 2000 to 18.3 percent in 2012, with a
peak of 23.4 percent in 2010.240 Detroit’s information technology, payroll,
tax, and financial reporting systems are functionally obsolete.241
Detroit’s revenues are also declining—income tax revenues declined to
$276 million, 30 percent less than 2002, and property tax revenues declined
10 percent, to $135 million, from 2012 to 2013 alone.242 Revenue from the
utility user’s tax was $39.8 million in 2012, a 28 percent decrease from a
decade ago.243 Concurrently, the city had operating deficits—$115 million
in 2012 alone.244
Detroit’s income tax rates of 2.4 percent for residents and 2.0 percent for
businesses are the highest in the state.245 Detroit’s property tax rates are the
highest among Michigan cities with populations exceeding 50,000.246
Income and property taxes are levied at Michigan’s statutory maximum,
prohibiting Detroit from possibly raising additional revenue through
increased taxation.247 A 5 percent utility user’s tax, levied on utility
services, is also set at the statutory maximum.248 The city also has a 10.9
percent casino tax that generates approximately $175 million, but new
casinos in Ohio are expected to erode these tax receipts.249
233. See Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 23.
234. See Uniform Crime Reports, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/clearances (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). Generally, the case
clearance rate is defined as the ratio of crimes where an offender is arrested, charged, and
referred to the prosecutor compared to the total number of crimes. Id.
235. See Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 24.
236. Id. at 24 n.7.
237. See Detroit, 504 B.R. at 120.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 119.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 120–21.
242. Id. at 118.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 119.
245. See Detroit Memorandum, supra note 12, at 28.
246. See id. at 28–29.
247. See id. at 29.
248. See id.
249. See Detroit, 504 B.R. at 118; see also CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH.,
DETROIT CITY GOVERNMENT REVENUES, REPORT 382 (2013), available at
http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2013/rpt382.pdf.
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Detroit is a classic, but not the only, structurally imbalanced bankruptcy.
Other structurally imbalanced bankruptcies include Stockton and Vallejo,
cities afflicted by a combination of legacy liabilities, deindustrialization,
fiscal mismanagement, and reduced tax revenue, which manifest themselves
over a period of time to create major financial stress.250
B. Is It a Municipality—And Authorized for Bankruptcy?
Public entities, creditors, and rating agencies alike can be uncertain in the
two-step process of whether an entity is a “municipality” and if so, whether
that municipality is specifically authorized to petition for bankruptcy. Prelending notice is relevant to the creditor’s ability to understand the risk
when providing credit to an entity.251 The first issue is whether the entity is
a municipality at all.252 Sophisticated creditors of cities and counties are
very likely aware that the entity is a municipality.253 However, with respect
to housing authorities, power plants, toll roads, and the like, a creditor may
be uncertain of the municipality’s status.254 A creditor then has to examine
the factors outlined above, including the amount of public control over an
entity, the entity’s taxing and assessment power, and the state’s statutory
classification of the entity.255 With creditor uncertainty of a municipality’s
status, credit risk can rise, making it more difficult to issue debt and
increasing the cost of servicing the debt.256
Further, the Bankruptcy Code requires that a municipality be specifically
authorized by the state to file for bankruptcy.257 Currently, the Code does
not contain a provision requiring a state to predetermine a municipality’s
specific authorization status for Chapter 9 prior to financial crisis.258
Certain states provide wide statutory authority for their municipalities to
petition for Chapter 9 relief.259 However, not every state grants its
municipalities authorization to access Chapter 9.260 Twenty-six states
250. See generally In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013); In re
City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
251. See, e.g., Ickowitz & McWhorter, supra note 197, at *7 (noting creditors’ rights are
limited in Chapter 9 bankruptcy); MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., WITHIN CHAPTER 9
FRAMEWORK, RECOVERY LEVELS VARY WIDELY 15 (2014), available at
http://www.stocktongov.com/files/2_26_2014_Chapter9_Doc_1274_ExhibitsA_B_InSuppor
tofFranklinHighCityConfirmationFirstAmendedPlan.pdf (noting that recent bankruptcy
results deviate substantially from creditor expectations). Without notice of ability to utilize
Chapter 9, creditors have less ability to rationally price the credit risk.
252. See supra notes 29–64 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 42–64 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 45–64 and accompanying text.
256. See Cody, supra note 205, at *13 (“[I]t is important for creditors to understand the
nature of their claims and their potential sources of recovery.”).
257. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). The rationale for the specific authorization
requirement is rooted in Congress’s deference to the Supreme Court’s Ashton ruling, which
principally was concerned with state sovereignty rights derived from the Tenth Amendment.
See supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text.
258. See Elkin, supra note 185, at *2.
259. See id.
260. See id.
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prohibit Chapter 9 filing, and if a municipality wants access to Chapter 9 in
those states, it would have to petition the state legislature to change the
law.261 Other states, such as Connecticut, allow the filing but require
“secondary special permission,” usually from the governor or legislature.262
Thus there is uncertainty from both the creditor’s and municipality’s
standpoint regarding whether a municipality will be specifically authorized
for filing.
The current rules also allow a state to authorize filing or disallow filing at
any time prior to a Chapter 9 petition.263 In one-time event bankruptcies,
the lack of clarity of specific authorization eliminates all notice of the
availability of Chapter 9. Municipalities and creditors alike are forced to
operate with the backdrop of federal bankruptcy law, without knowing in
many instances if the state will provide specific authorization.264
In structural imbalance bankruptcies, municipalities and creditors have
more notice of financial struggles but still may be uncertain of the
availability of Chapter 9, for the same reasons as one-time event
bankruptcies.265 The Code only requires specific authorization from the
state, but that authorization can come any time prior to the filing, including
just before the filing.266 In this situation, the creditor will not know
whether the municipality will have specific authorization from the state to
file, but the creditor must operate with the backdrop that a Chapter 9
petition is possible.
C. Measuring “Insolvency”
Multiple variables play into the Chapter 9 insolvency calculation. This
section details the insolvency requirement, beginning with the accounting
methodology, and then illustrates how a municipality can demonstrate
insolvency using either a current or prospective calculation. Finally, this
section describes the tension between creditors and debtors regarding the
inclusion of nonessential assets and potential assets in an insolvency
calculation.
1. Current or Prospective, and If So, How Far?
Insolvency is measured differently in different sections of the Bankruptcy
Code.267 Unlike a business in Chapter 11, a municipality must be insolvent
to be eligible for Chapter 9 protection.268 In contrast to Chapter 11’s

261. See id.
262. See id.
263. Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from
Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 255 (2012).
264. See Kordana, supra note 91, at 1044–45.
265. See supra notes 251–64 and accompanying text.
266. See Moringiello, supra note 263, at 255. The state also can revoke its specific
authorization at any time prior to filing. Id.
267. See supra notes 181–83 and accompanying text.
268. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012).
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balance sheet insolvency method,269 Chapter 9 uses a cash flow analysis,
where, to be considered insolvent, a municipality must demonstrate that it is
generally not paying, or will be unable to pay, debts as they become due.270
Chapter 9 requires that insolvency be “real and not transitory,” such that the
municipality is in “bona fide financial distress that is not likely to be
resolved without use of federal bankruptcy power to impair contracts.”271
The “will not be able to pay” insolvency test is a prospective standard,
thereby allowing a municipality to seek protection prior to running out of
money.272 The Code does not provide a methodology for prospective
insolvency determination, leaving courts to analyze prospective insolvency
on a case-by-case basis.273
The date of filing currently serves as a reference for the insolvency
analysis based on precedent originating from In re City of Bridgeport,274 as
debts may fluctuate depending on the financial stressors that precipitated
the filing.275 In Bridgeport, the judge noted that “neither § 101(32)(C)(ii)
nor its legislative history provide guidance on how far into the future [the
insolvency analysis] should go.”276 In 2012, the Stockton proceedings
confirmed “how far one looks into the future to discern insolvency has not
been settled.”277
Clearly, the further the projection is into the future, the less accurate it
will be. In Bridgeport, the court identified many of the variables affecting a
municipality’s fiscal condition, including the health of the local, national,
and international economy; state and federal aid; labor concessions;
voluntary tax abatements; tax increases; tax collection rates, and the success
of borrowing attempts.278 The court ultimately dismissed the Chapter 9
petition, holding that the city had not demonstrated insolvency because of
the uncertainty in the city’s projected budget deficit and cash position.279
Bridgeport is representative of problems with projected insolvency, where a
city is attempting to protect assets but is uncertain whether it will qualify as
insolvent without more definitive statutory guidance or consistent precedent
from the courts.
Additionally, Chapter 9’s cash flow insolvency analysis essentially
ignores asset valuation, including nonessential assets as discussed below.

269. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (detailing Chapter 11’s balance sheet
approach—where the liabilities of an entity are subtracted from the assets to determine
insolvency).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)i–ii; see also In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18,
32–35 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
271. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 773 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
272. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
273. See id. at 337.
274. 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
275. See id. at 337–38.
276. See id. at 337.
277. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
278. See Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 338.
279. See id. at 339. The Bridgeport government had not approved next year’s budget at
the time of the petition, compounding the uncertainty. Id.

2734

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

2. Nontraditional Asset Classes and Potential Assets
Part II.C.1 outlined how bankruptcy courts apply cash-flow methodology
to determine whether a municipality is either currently or prospectively cash
flow insolvent.280 The cash flow analysis could allow a city with
significant nonessential assets to be considered insolvent, and thus file for
Chapter 9, while maintaining those assets.281 Currently, § 904 prevents
courts from interfering with the debtor’s political or governmental powers,
property or revenues, or the use or enjoyment of any income-producing
property.282 Unlike Chapter 11, Chapter 9 does not provide any provision
for liquidation of the debtor’s assets or distribution of those assets to
creditors.283 Section 903 explicitly provides that the Bankruptcy Code does
not limit or impair the state’s power to control its municipalities.284
Detroit has an interesting asset situation. The Detroit Institute of Art
(DIA) is owned by the city and currently houses 65,000 works of art that
are collectively considered one of the most prominent art museums in the
United States.285 Detroit owns a “significant portion” of the DIA
Collection, which was acquired in three ways: (1) a 1919 asset transfer,286
(2) art that was purchased by the city, and (3) art donated to the city after
the asset transfer.287 In 1930, with the city’s collection growing to 12,000
works, the city financed and constructed the current museum building.288
In anticipation of its Chapter 9 proceedings, Detroit retained Christie’s to
appraise the fair market value of the artwork that Detroit acquired using city
funds.289 The appraisal consisted of 2781 works, with a total appraisal
value of $454 million to $866 million.290 Christie’s classified 406 of the
appraised items as “most valuable works”—items with individual values
greater than $50,000—and noted that the most valuable works represented
more than 99 percent of the total appraisal value.291 Interestingly, eleven of
the appraised works represented 75 percent of the total estimated value, and
just three represented more than half the value: Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s
The Wedding Dance ($100–$200 million), Vincent Van Gogh’s Self

280. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 45 (2015).
281. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
282. See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
283. Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
284. See 11 U.S.C. § 903.
285. See Detroit Disclosure Statement, supra note 226, at 26.
286. From 1885 to 1919, the museum was a separate corporation, but in 1919 the museum
transferred ownership of the 4400 works of art, along with the property and original museum
structure, to the City of Detroit pursuant to Michigan Public Law and the Detroit City
Charter. Id. The transferor-corporation remained in existence after the transfer, contracting
with Detroit to operate the museum. Id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 75. The smaller number denotes a conservative price and the higher
number represents the most advantageous estimate.
291. Id.
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Portrait with Straw Hat ($80–$150 million), and Rembrandt’s The
Visitation ($50–$90 million).292
Christie’s report recommended several options that the city could use to
generate revenue from the collection absent selling any of the artwork,
including (1) pledging some or all of the art as collateral for a loan,
(2) generating revenue by leasing the masterpieces to other art museums,
(3) creating a “masterpiece trust,”293 (4) selling artwork to a philanthropist
or charity on the condition that they permanently lend the work to the
Detroit Institute of Art, or (5) mounting a travelling exhibition of
masterpiece works.294
Multiple creditors, including Syncora Guarantee Inc. and Financial
Guarantee Insurance Company (FGIC), contended that the city should be
required to monetize its nonessential assets or receive loans to pay off
creditors that are secured by art assets, which Detroit opposes.295 Detroit’s
position was that any art sale would irreparably harm the DIA and that the
options to generate revenue while retaining title were not viable.296
In 2014, during the confirmation phase of the bankruptcy proceedings,
the City of Detroit and the Detroit Art Institute commissioned Artvest
Partners to perform a complete appraisal of the entire collection,
irrespective of the title acquiring method. Artvest’s appraisal returned an
estimate range between $2.76 billion and $4.61 billion.297 However,
Artvest’s report identified a series of additional factors that it considered
likely to reduce the generated revenue, including unsold rates, the impact of
immediate liquidation, or alternatively a “blockage discount”—a reduction
in sale price when selling a large group of similar items—and issues with a
large offering with the main art auction houses.298 Artvest also noted legal
obstacles and corresponding litigation of the asset sales that may cloud the
title and prevent the receipt of more than the deposit.299 Based on those
discount factors, Artvest estimated that the collection would sell for “$1.1
billion for the present value of an orderly sale after a prolonged
litigation . . . to $1.8 billion for the present value of an orderly liquidation
without litigation.”300 Further, it countered each of Christie’s monetization
suggestions, generally concluding that the solutions were not viable.301
Artvest’s report concluded “[r]ather than being a source of cash to creditors
292. Id.
293. See id. This unprecedented arrangement would transfer city-owned art into a trust,
with minority trust interest sold to individual museums, entitling them to borrow works for
finite predetermined amounts of time. Id.
294. See id.
295. Khalil AlHajal, Opening Argument in Detroit Bankruptcy Trial: Selling Art, Raising
Taxes Aren’t Reasonable Options, MLIVE (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.mlive.com
/news/detroit/index.ssf/2014/09/opening_argument_in_detroit_ba.html.
296. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
297. ARTVEST, EXPERT WITNESS REPORT OF MICHAEL PLUMMER 19 (2014), available at
http://archive.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C422218479.pdf.
298. Id. at 26–30.
299. See id. at 31–32.
300. Id. at 37.
301. See id. at 42–47.
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or a burden on the current city, in fact the DIA is the single most important
cultural asset the City currently owns for rebuilding the vitality of the
city.”302
The creditors extrapolated the value of the Christie’s appraisal to imply
that the residual 95 percent of the collection303 could be valued from “$11
billion to as much as $21 billion.”304 That report indicated that “instead of
continuing to burden Detroiters, a DIA de-accessioning offers the potential
for asset value realization that the City might use to consensually satisfy
creditor claims while liberating . . . reinvestment [capital]” to utilize for city
rehabilitation.305
The use of nonessential assets, such as art, particularly when the value is
substantial compared to the budget deficit, is relevant in both the insolvency
analysis and the confirmation phase “fair and equitable” analysis. In
Detroit’s confirmation proceedings, Judge Rhodes asked Detroit’s
emergency manager, “Why not monetize the art?”306 The emergency
manager responded that he believed that selling the art would “harm [the
DIA] irreparably.”307 While Chapter 9 does not require the city to sell
assets, the nonessential assets are considered by applying the good faith
requirement to the insolvency analysis discussed in Part II.C and the good
faith analysis discussed in Part II.D. This is particularly relevant in a
situation like Detroit’s, where Detroit’s 2013 budget deficit of $125 million
was less than the average appraisal value of Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s The
Wedding Dance ($100–200 million).308
While the Detroit bankruptcy is perhaps the most interesting case
involving assets in a Chapter 9 proceeding, other cases have also examined
the assets of a municipality and how their use relates to the various issues in
a bankruptcy petition. In In re Pierce County Housing Authority,309 the
court addressed the creditor’s argument that the Housing Authority was not
insolvent because it had assets consisting of fourteen buildings and other
equipment worth approximately $44 million as of the petition date.310
Pierce County involved a one-time event bankruptcy, where tort liability
from a class of plaintiffs claiming damage from mold at one of defendant’s

302. Id. at 48.
303. Christie’s appraised 2726 of the 65,000 pieces, or approximately 5 percent, of the
artwork. See supra notes 285–90 and accompanying text.
304. Motion of Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code Directing the Debtor to Cooperate with Interested Parties Seeking to
Conduct Due Diligence on the Art Collection Housed at the Detroit Institute of Arts, In re
City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2014) (No. 13-53846), available at
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/docket3925.pdf, at *2.
305. See id. at *5.
306. Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge: ‘Why Not Monetize the Art?’ USA
TODAY (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/10/03/detroitbankruptcy-judge-why-not-monetize-the-art/16675813/.
307. Id.
308. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
309. 414 B.R. 702 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009).
310. Id. at 711.
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affordable housing facilities precipitated the Chapter 11 filing.311 However,
the court found that thirteen of the fourteen buildings were subject to liens,
and the debtor could not increase rents to generate revenue because of state
law restrictions.312
In In re City of Vallejo, unions challenged Vallejo’s petition by asserting,
among other things, that the city’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(CAFR) reflected total assets of $1 billion and $624 million of net assets in
excess of liabilities.313 Vallejo held its unrestricted assets in a general fund
account that it used to bridge deficits in different accounts.314 However, the
general fund recorded multimillion dollar deficits in the prior three years—
as a result, the general fund was depleted, and a projected deficit of $17
million was projected for 2007–2008, with labor costs alone exceeding
revenues.315 State law prevented the general fund from borrowing from
restricted accounts without demonstrating a balanced budget and the ability
to repay the restricted fund within a year.316 The union objectors advanced
an argument that Vallejo was not insolvent, and the city should have
“pillaged all of its component agency funds, ignor[ed] bond covenants,
grant restrictions, and normal [accounting] practices . . . to subsidize its
General Fund.”317 While the bankruptcy appellate panel318 noted that the
city “cannot squirrel away money it can use for operations in a fund, argue
the fund is restricted and then claim insolvency,”319 the court held that
using restricted funds was impermissible and that the union’s other
suggestions, including an offer that would prevent bankruptcy this year but
apply “onerous” terms in future years, would “leave Vallejo more
debilitated tomorrow than it is today,” as restricted funds would be
exhausted while revenues plunged and expenses surged.320 The appellate
court thus held that the bankruptcy court’s insolvency findings were
“supported by the record.”321
In contrast, In re Ellicott School Building Authority, the court found that
the building authority had not satisfied its burden in demonstrating
insolvency, where the entity had alternative sources to successfully make its
debt payments, including reserve funds and a defaulted rent payment.322
311. See id. at 706–08.
312. See id. at 711–12.
313. In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 285 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). Vallejo was a
structural bankruptcy—revenue was steadily declining and labor and expenses were rising,
leading to an unstainable economic condition.
314. See id. at 286.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 290–91.
318. Bankruptcy appellate panels are three-judge panels that hear bankruptcy appeals.
The panels are part of the federal appellate court system. See Bankruptcy Appellate Panels,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Court
ofAppeals/BankruptcyAppellatePanels.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
319. See Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 290.
320. See id. at 293–94.
321. See id. at 294. The court noted that a bankruptcy court’s findings are reviewed only
for “clear error.” Id.
322. Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
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Specifically, the authority did not show that it was unable to collect the
defaulted rent payments that it was owed, and it had sufficient reserve funds
to make the payment.323
In In re City of Stockton, the bankruptcy court considered the debtor
municipality’s failure to go to voters with tax increases under a creditor’s
insolvency objection rather than a bad faith objection.324 The court found
that Stockton was service delivery insolvent, and that while cash insolvency
is the controlling Chapter 9 criterion for insolvency, the “degree of inability
to fund essential government services” is relevant to the assessment of
degree and duration of that insolvency, and evidence that the insolvency is
not of a “mere technical insolvency.”325 The court held that failure to place
a tax increase on the ballot is not persuasive of solvency, noting, “[p]utting
the fiscal house in order so that voters might be willing to entertain tax
increases is the whole point of chapter 9.”326
Boise County’s bankruptcy petition, a one-time event bankruptcy caused
by an adverse tort judgment,327 was dismissed because the bankruptcy court
held that Boise had not established insolvency per § 101(32)(C)(ii).328
Boise conceded that it was paying all debts as they became due,329 but filed
a Chapter 9 petition when it became fearful that the tort creditor would
execute on the county’s accounts and thus interfere with county
operations.330 The petition listed assets of $27.7 million and liabilities of
$7.3 million, including the judgment and litigation fees.331 Boise County
had $2.05 million in unrestricted “trust accounts” and nearly $10 million in
cash and investments in a series of restricted accounts.332
Further, while Idaho law generally prohibited expenditures exceeding the
adopted budget, it allowed Boise to issue registered warrants paid by tax
increases to “meet mandatory expenditures required by law.”333 The court
held that among the unrestricted trust accounts, the surplus restricted
accounts, and the ability to issue warrants, that Boise had sufficient funds to
pay the judgment, and had not established insolvency under
§ 101(32)(C)(ii).334
These examples demonstrate that the courts take a fact intensive
approach when determining what role the utilization of nonessential and
potential assets should play in the insolvency calculation. Thus, because
323. See id.
324. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). The court noted
the state law constraints on raising taxes (Proposition 13) requires voters to approve any tax
increase and also caps that increase. Id.
325. Id. at 789, 791.
326. Id. at 790.
327. In re Boise Cnty., 465 B.R. 156, 161 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011).
328. See id. at 180.
329. See id. at 171.
330. See id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 164. The court also found that the county had not established that surplus
funds in the restricted accounts were inaccessible. See id. at 180.
333. Id. at 173, 178–79 (emphasis removed).
334. Id. at 180.
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compelled utilization of certain assets may be precluded by statutory law
and insolvency results are largely fact dependent, a municipality’s good
faith plays an important role in bankruptcy eligibility and plan
confirmation.
D. Good Faith
Chapter 9 requires good faith at both the petition phase and the
confirmation phase. The Bankruptcy Code requires that a municipality’s
petition be submitted in good faith or the court may dismiss the petition
altogether.335 The purpose of the statutory good faith requirement is to
prevent manipulation and abuse of the process.336 However, courts have
interpreted this power to be permissive, not mandatory, providing the court
with a great deal of discretion as the gatekeeper for Chapter 9
proceedings.337 Congress, in both the enacted statute and the legislative
history, was silent on the definition of good faith, leaving the meaning of
good faith in this context to be interpreted by the courts.338 Courts have
interpreted the good faith requirement to “preserve the protection of the
Code for those which it was actually intended,”339 and accordingly have
developed a series of factors that may be considered in the good faith
analysis.340
In New York City Off-Track Betting Corp.,341 the court applied a series of
factors derived from Collier on Bankruptcy to analyze a municipality’s
good faith, including: a municipality’s subjective beliefs; the scope and
nature of municipality’s financial distress; the ability to address the
municipality’s financial distress under Chapter 9; the municipality’s
motivation for filing Chapter 9; the municipality’s pre-petition negotiations
with creditors; and alternatives to Chapter 9.342 The court also looked to
Chapter 11 appellate precedent to determine factors that indicate bad
faith.343 Courts in other circuits also utilize Chapter 11 appellate precedent
335. See supra note 194.
336. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
337. See In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 79–80 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994).
338. Vazquez, supra note 161, at *10 (citing Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist.,
165 B.R. at 80).
339. See id.
340. See In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id. In a Chapter 11 filing, the Second Circuit bad faith analysis identifies eight
factors that are “indicative of a bad faith filing,” including: (1) debtor only has one asset;
(2) debtor has only few unsecured creditors and unsecured claims are disproportionately
small compared to secured claims; (3) debtor’s one asset is subject to a foreclosure action
resulting from default or late payment; (4) debtor’s financial condition is essentially a twoparty dispute that could be resolved in state foreclosure action; (5) timing of debtor’s filing is
evidence of intent to delay or frustrate secured creditors’ legitimate enforcement rights;
(6) debtor has negligible or nonexistent cash flow; (7) debtor cannot pay current expenses
including personal property payments and real estate taxes; and (8) debtor does not have
employees. Id.
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for good faith analysis, including the Ninth Circuit which employs a
“‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ analysis,” and “determine[s] a debtor's
good faith on a case-by case basis, taking into account the particular
features of each plan.”344
1. Good Faith at the Petition Phase
Courts have rejected municipal bankruptcy filings at the petition phase
on the grounds of bad faith. In In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse
Disposal District, the municipal debtors owed payments to a private
incinerator stemming from a joint venture agreement between the
municipality and the private facility operator.345 The debtors did not
attempt to exercise their pre-bankruptcy assessment powers to require their
constituents to meet the burgeoning debt.346 The bankruptcy court noted
that the “hurdles to Chapter 9 were undoubtedly designed to prevent []
‘capricious filing,’” and held that municipalities petitioning for Chapter 9
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that they used their taxing and assessment
powers to a “reasonable extent, or in their pre-petition negotiations have
committed to the use of those powers as part of a comprehensive and
appropriate work out of their financial problems.”347
Other bankruptcy courts have declined to invoke this type of mandate. In
In re McCurtain Municipal Authority,348 the debtor, a water service
provider in a small rural town, owed the contractor of its waste water
system monies from a state court judgment regarding disputed payments at
the end of the construction contract.349 The debtor’s Chapter 9 petition was
challenged by the creditor on grounds that the debtor had unrestricted cash
and grant money, and had failed to assess citizens or impose higher rates
even though it had the authority to do so.350 The court found that the failure
to exercise that authority did not necessarily indicate bad faith, relying on
evidence that rates were higher than in surrounding areas and that the area
was low-income, and thus it was unlikely that imposing higher rates would
have generated sufficient funds to cover the debt.351
In Detroit’s petition phase, creditors challenged the filing on the grounds
that the city did not act in good faith.352 Objectors argued that Detroit’s
filing was a culmination of city and state efforts to impair pension rights
through a bankruptcy filing, by reducing state revenue sharing, suppressing
344. Westamerica Bank v. Mendocino Coast Recreation & Park Dist. (In re Mendocino
Coast Recreation & Park Dist.), No. 12-02591, 2013 WL 5423788, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2013) (citing In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
345. See In re Sullivan Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 63 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1994).
346. See id. at 82.
347. Id. at 82–83.
348. No. 07-80363, 2007 WL 4287604 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2007).
349. See id. at *1.
350. See id. at *5.
351. See id. at *6.
352. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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information about the city’s valuable assets, and concealing the objective of
state laws passed shortly prior to the bankruptcy petition.353 The court
acknowledged that “many people in Detroit hold to this narrative,” and
noted that some evidence that supported this view, including a pitch from a
leading law firm on a roadmap to Chapter 9.354 The pitch included the idea
of “establishing a good faith record of negotiations,” using an emergency
manager for “political cover,” and warning against pre-petition asset
monetization to insure insolvency.355
The court ultimately held that Detroit’s filing was in good faith, noting
that the financial problems are the “type contemplated for chapter 9 relief,”
the reasons are consistent with the purpose of Chapter 9, the city made
efforts to improve its finances, and city residents would be severely
prejudiced if the case was dismissed.356 The court noted that of paramount
importance was that the residents would be “severely prejudiced,” while
referencing the fact that the city’s accelerating debt service obligations
would utilize 65 percent of the city’s budget by 2017.357
2. Good Faith at the Confirmation Phase
Good faith issues also arise at the confirmation stage.358 Section 1129
requires that for confirmation of a plan, the plan must have “been proposed
in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law.”359 Section
1129(b)(2) requires that a plan be “fair and equitable” with respect to each
class of creditors.360 Thus, good faith is implicated when reviewing an
adjustment plan for unfair discrimination that arises when “providing
materially disparate treatment to two classes of bonds having substantially
similar legal rights.”361
In In re Mount Carbon Metropolitan District,362 the court held that the
debt adjustment plan was not proposed in good faith, where the plan
ignored the municipality’s current and future obligation to provide public
services to its constituents.363 The debt adjustment plan had included full
payment over forty years, but had effectively transferred the municipality’s
taxing powers to a landowner, which “unfairly favored” itself and
disadvantaged the others, and thus the plan fell “outside the policy and
purpose of Chapter 9.”364
353. See id. at 182.
354. See id. at 184.
355. See id.
356. Id. at 187.
357. See id. at 188–89.
358. See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 39 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
359. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012).
360. Id. § 1129(b)(2).
361. Gary M. Kaplan, Understanding the Chapter 9 Process and Strategies for
Representing Creditors and Other Key Constituents in a Municipal Bankruptcy Case, in
REPRESENTING CREDITORS, supra note 99, available at 2014 WL 4785316, at *5.
362. 242 B.R. 18 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
363. See id. at 41.
364. Id.
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While not couched in terms of “good faith” per se, the court in Stockton
reviewed the confirmation plan for unfair discrimination between creditor
classes.365 The bankruptcy judge confirmed Stockton’s plan to exit
bankruptcy.366 Stockton, as with all municipalities that reorganized in
Chapter 9, had a significant amount of control over the proposed debt
adjustment plan.367 Stockton’s proposal allocated to several bond creditors
pennies on the dollar, while leaving the California Public Employees’
Moody’s
Retirement System (CalPERS) contribution untouched.368
Investor Service commented that Stockton’s “[p]roposed recovery rates for
lease revenue and other general-fund supported bonds range from [1 percent
to 100 percent] . . . [and] [b]etween these two extremes, holders of pension
obligation bonds, which are secured by a bare contractual repayment
obligation, would see a 50 [percent] recovery.”369 Moody’s noted that the
exit plan proposal may “deviate from what the bankruptcy code provides
for certain classes of debt.”370
Creditors—including two Franklin Municipal Bond Mutual Funds
(“Franklin”)—argued that the city failed to provide Franklin a reasonable
recovery, focusing on, among other things, the city’s refusal to confront
pension obligation issues.371 Franklin argued that Stockton lacked good
faith as the plan provided combined recoveries of over 70 percent to retirees
while proposing that Franklin receive one quarter of one percent.372
Further, Franklin argued that the exit plan unfairly discriminated by
providing similarly situated unsecured creditors with disproportionate
recoveries.373
Franklin noted that in the pre-bankruptcy neutral evaluation, the city
proposed to use public facility fees (PFFs) to pay off 54.5 percent of the
Franklin debt.374 At that time, the city apparently recognized that its failure
to maximize available PFFs for Franklin would be “a sign of bad faith.”375
Franklin also argued that Stockton’s “wholesale assumption of its single
365. See Walsh, supra note 132.
366. See id.
367. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
368. See Walsh, supra note 132. Previously, the court had ruled that Stockton would
have been free to modify its contract with CalPERs, holding that CalPERs would be
classified as a mere unsecured creditor. See id. Stockton argued that if pensions were cut,
workers—and particularly the police—would exit the force in search of similar pensions in
adjacent cities. See Alison Vekshin & Michael Bathon, Stockton’s Costly Bankruptcy May
Not Tempt Other Cities, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-31/stockton-s-costly-bankruptcy-maynot-tempt-other-cities.
369. See Summary Objection of Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund and Franklin
California High Yield Mutual Fund to Confirmation of First Amended Plan of Adjustment of
Debts of the City of Stockton, Cal., In re City of Stockton, No. 12-cv-32118, at 48 (E.D. Cal.
May 12, 2014) (citing MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., supra note 251, at 15).
370. Id. at 48.
371. Id. at 2.
372. See id. at 4.
373. See id. at 3.
374. See id. at 23.
375. See id. at 53.
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largest liability—unfunded pensions—further evidence[d] that the Plan
lack[ed] the good faith basis necessary for confirmation.”376 Franklin noted
that, if the city was truly interested in “treat[ing] all interested parties fairly”
and “provid[ing] creditors the potential for the greatest economic return
from its assets,” it would have addressed its pension problem.377
Finally, Franklin contended that the city disregarded Vallejo’s
bankruptcy confirmation—another town on the San Francisco Bay—where
long-term obligations were not sufficiently modified to reduce fiscal
imbalance.378 The Stockton court approved Stockton’s plan, with the judge
stating, “I’ve looked long and hard at this case and the responses that have
been made, including the alternative of putting the whole situation back to
Square 1, which is what would be required” if he rejected Stockton’s
plan.379 In his ruling, the judge noted that some concessions were made
with respect to legacy benefits, including the cancellation of the retiree
health plan.380
In Detroit’s adjustment plan, the city, the state, and certain creditors
negotiated a “Grand Bargain”—an agreement that raises approximately
$816 million over twenty years from foundations, the DIA, and the State of
Michigan.381 The Grand Bargain allocates the funds towards Detroit’s
pension obligations and transfers ownership of the DIA to an independent
nonprofit.382 The agreement was contingent on votes from pensioners and

376. Id. at 54.
377. See id. Franklin also argued that, like pensioners, many of the fund’s holders are
retirees that rely on Franklin funds for income. See id. at 57.
378. See id. at 56. Recent press accounts speculate that Vallejo risks entering “Chapter
18”—a euphemistic expression for entering Chapter 9 a second time—because of current
budget difficulties. Id. Moody’s reported that “Vallejo substantially restructured its
compensation structure, including significant cuts to retiree health care benefits, but by
failing to address its pension liabilities it remains vulnerable to increasing annual payments.”
Moody’s: Bankrupt California Cities Face Steep Climb to Solvency Without Pension Relief,
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV. (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.moodys.com/research/MoodysBankrupt-California-cities-face-steep-climb-to-solvency-without--PR_293349.
However,
Vallejo’s city finance officer stated, “We are not on the brink of [a second]
bankruptcy . . . [w]e are not going there,” concurring with the Mayor Davis who opined,
“‘We are doing everything we can to try to make the ends meet,’ Davis said, ‘It’s going to be
a tough struggle, but I’m sure we will get there.’” Ed Mendel, Vallejo Bankrupt Again? “We
Are Not Going There,” PUBLICCEO (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.publicceo.com/2014
/03/vallejo-bankrupt-again-we-are-not-going-there/.
379. See Walsh, supra note 132. Until 2008, Stockton had promised every city worker
and their dependents free retirement health care but had not set aside any money to fund the
health benefits. See id.
380. See id. CalPERs had argued that Stockton’s termination of the plan would trigger a
$1.6 billion fee, equal to the sum of all current and future obligations. The judge ruled that
federal law preempted state law, and once Stockton petitioned for bankruptcy, it was able to
modify its contract with CalPERs, subject to conformance with the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code. See id.
381. Mark Stryker, Detroit Museum Announces $26.8 Million in Gifts, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (July 16, 2014), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140716/ENT05/307160042/detroitinstitute-of-arts-grand-bargain-gilbert.
382. See id.
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other creditors,383 and on July 11, 2014, the pensioner classes voted yes,
while the secured and unsecured creditors voted no.384
The largest opponents of the Grand Bargain were bond insurers,
including FGIC and Syncora, which control $1.4 billion in pension
certificate debt.385 The creditors challenged, among other things, that the
plan was not “legal, fair and feasible,” in that it unfairly discriminated
against the bond creditors in favor of the pension creditors.386 Eventually,
Syncora agreed on a settlement that included $25 million, a thirty-year
parking garage lease, and other benefits.387 After a series of courtmandated mediation sessions, FGIC agreed to settle for 13 cents on the
dollar and the rights to develop a new mixed-use complex in downtown
Detroit.388 Two other dissenting classes, including civil claimants and
rejected contract and lease claims, opposed confirmation to the end.389
In November 2014, Judge Rhodes ruled on the adjustment plan, noting
that “whether discrimination is unfair turns on ‘matters of conscience,’
informed by factors such as the [congressional] purpose of municipal
bankruptcy and the judge’s ‘experience, education and sense of
morality.’”390 The judge stated that the city’s treatment of the pension
claimants “demonstrated a substantial mission-related justification” by
attempting to preserve relationships with employees and maintain their
motivation.391 With respect to the dissenting classes, Judge Rhodes found
no similar justification.392 The court concluded that if each settlement
within a plan is reasonable, “then the resulting discrimination in the plan
must be fair.”393
Commentators worry that the “[unfair discrimination] test’s reliance on
settlement could write unfair discrimination out of the statute altogether.”394
383. Nathan Bomey & Matt Helms, Detroit Pensioners Back Grand Bargain in
Bankruptcy Vote, Creditors Object, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 22, 2014, 12:47 AM),
http://archive.freep.com/article/20140721/NEWS01/307210176/Detroit-bankruptcy-pensiongrand-bargain-vote.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. Id. The plan proposed a negligible recovery for bondholders while providing a 60
percent combined recovery for unsecured pension creditors.
387. Joe Guillen, Bankruptcy Trial Resumes As Creditors Make Their Case, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:01 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroitbankruptcy/2014/10/14/bankruptcy-trial-resumes/17217977/.
388. Joe Guillen, Detroit Council OKs FGIC Bankruptcy Settlement, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct. 23, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/
2014/10/23/council-approves-fgic/17789601/.
389. Melissa Jacoby, Detroit’s Bankruptcy: End(s) and Means, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 10,
2014, 9:09 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/11/detroits-restructuring-endsand-means.html#more.
390. Id.
391. See Oral Opinion on the Record at 30, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Detroit Oral Opinion], available at
http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Co
nfirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FINAL_for_Release.pdf.
392. See Jacoby, supra note 389.
393. Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 391, at 32.
394. See Jacoby, supra note 389.
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Further, with the focus on accepting classes rather than dissenting classes, it
is easy to apply, but if one focuses on involuntary creditors—those with tort
or civil rights claims—it is more difficult to understand what their
“reasonable expectations” were.395
E. The Problem with the Current Structure for Both Debtors and Creditors
The uncertainties in municipality treatment, asset usage, insolvency
calculations, and the method in which good faith is applied to analyze the
proceedings cause problems for both debtors and creditors. For municipal
debtors, increased borrowing costs, contagion issues, and uncertain
eligibility for relief are detrimental.
Creditors have limited recourse once the petition is accepted, as the
municipality can spend and borrow without court approval while not being
subject to the reporting or other general duties of the Chapter 11 debtor.396
A municipality is able to propose and bind all creditors to a confirmed plan,
while avoiding “preferences, fraudulent conveyances and other
transfers.”397 With uncertain treatment on a case-by-case basis, there is
additional room to clarify the application of Chapter 9 by differentiating
between one-time event and structurally imbalanced bankruptcies.
III. CLARIFYING CHAPTER 9
Part III proposes a new multipart test for analyzing whether a
municipality meets the statutory conditions required for Chapter 9
municipal bankruptcy. The test entails four factors to apply to the two main
types of municipal bankruptcy: one-time events and significant long-term
structural imbalance bankruptcy. One time bankruptcies, including Ellicott
School District, Pierce County Housing Authority, Sullivan County
Regional Refuse, Jefferson County, Orange County, and Boise County,
should be analyzed under a different framework than Detroit, Stockton, and
Vallejo—their structural imbalance counterparts. The four factors weigh
(1) whether the petition is prospective or current; (2) whether creditors had
notice of specific authorization; (3) whether the debtor utilized available
assets pre-petition; and (4) whether the debtor acted in good faith. Good
faith has two related prongs, the good faith of the debtor at the petition
phase and maintenance of that good faith in the confirmation phase. Part III
evaluates how the four factors apply in the context of a one-time event
bankruptcy and a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy.
A. The “Municipality” and “Eligibility” Certainty Factor
The first factor that bankruptcy courts always have to consider is whether
the entity is a municipality that is specifically authorized for Chapter 9
bankruptcy.398 This factor is most relevant in the context of a one-time
395.
396.
397.
398.

See id.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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event bankruptcy. One-time event bankruptcies generally run the entire
gamut of cities, counties, and towns all the way to infrastructure entities,
hospitals, and housing authorities.399 For special purpose municipalities—
infrastructure entities, hospitals, and housing authorities—it is often more
questionable whether the entity is a municipality for the purposes of
Chapter 9.400 Uncertainty as to whether an entity is a municipality further
increases uncertainty as to whether that entity will be specifically
authorized to utilize Chapter 9. When evaluating a bankruptcy petition and
confirmation plan in a one-time event bankruptcy, courts should consider
whether the state specifically authorized Chapter 9 for all municipalities,
whether that authorization was contingent on additional state action, and the
timing of authorization, i.e., whether the state authorized the Chapter 9
petition right before the filing without previously authorizing Chapter 9
filings in any capacity.401 The less notice the creditor had with respect to
the ability for a municipality to utilize Chapter 9, the more critically the
court should examine whether the municipality acted in good faith in the
petition and confirmation stage.
Structurally imbalanced municipalities are generally cities or counties,
and thus there is more certainty that the entity qualifies as a municipality for
Chapter 9. The court can immediately move to evaluate the level of notice
that a state’s laws provided creditors. As with one-time event bankruptcies,
the less notice of Chapter 9 eligibility a creditor has, the more critically the
bankruptcy court should review whether the municipality acted in good
faith in the petition and at the confirmation stage.
Finally, Congress could consider adding a requirement that states identify
whether an entity is a municipality specifically authorized for Chapter 9
prior to a certain date. A statute requiring states to classify their
municipalities prior to a certain date would likely be upheld if challenged
under the Tenth Amendment. The state retains complete control over the
authorization decision, and the state could still revoke the authorization at
any time, which is likely beneficial from a creditor’s standpoint. While a
congressional mandate would impose initial compliance costs for states,
this mechanism would provide municipalities and creditors with clarity
regarding an entity’s Chapter 9 eligibility.
B. The Insolvency Factors
Calculating insolvency is of critical importance to Chapter 9. First, this
section discusses current insolvency versus prospective insolvency and
suggests that there are certain situations where courts should permit
prospective insolvency petitions and other situations where the court likely
should permit only current insolvency petitions. Next, this section suggests
that utilization of nonessential assets and potential assets should be
considered heavily in one-time event bankruptcies. Lastly, it argues that
399. See supra Part I.A.
400. See supra Part I.A.2.
401. See supra notes 260–62.
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utilization of potential assets is less important in structurally imbalanced
bankruptcies, and that utilization of nonessential assets should be
considered in the insolvency calculation if those assets can overcome a
substantial portion of the structural imbalance.
1. Current Insolvency, Prospective Insolvency, or Both?
In a one-time event bankruptcy, the debts of an entity are generally
known and the real question is how to measure the assets and project future
cash flows. In Boise County, the court evaluated Boise’s assets and its
ability to issue warrants for future payment in relation to the adverse
judgment, and calculated that Boise had not established insolvency.402 In
Ellicott, the court found that the school building authority had alternative
sources to successfully make its debt payments, including reserve fund
assets and a defaulted rent payment.403 In Pierce County Housing
Authority, the court noted that nearly all the assets of the authority were
subject to liens and thus it could not monetize its assets to avoid insolvency,
and therefore was insolvent.404
In a one-time event bankruptcy, current insolvency should be favored.
As the debt is relatively quantifiable in these bankruptcies, particularly
those caused by an adverse judgment or a bad contract, the municipality
should be able to show that it is currently insolvent to receive relief. If a
municipality in a one-time event bankruptcy attempted to show prospective
insolvency instead of current insolvency, the court should be wary of the
petition. Otherwise, a financially sound entity may be able to simply
project future insolvency to discharge debt, without making sufficient effort
to avoid the petition. Of course, a municipality making these projections
still would have to show that they negotiated in good faith and desired to
effect a plan to adjust its debts pursuant to § 109(4),405 but it is difficult to
demonstrate that prospective estimates are incorrect.
Given the uncertainty of future projections, for one-time events,
prospective insolvency should be considered as a significant negative
against a one-time petition. Even in the event where a municipality could
argue that it does not know the extent of the problem, like the Jefferson
County fraud,406 it is better for the municipality to understand the fraud prepetition. However, if a municipality has debts that are accelerating and still
uncertain—similar to Orange County, where losses resulted from bad
investments and swaps—unless the losses can be stopped by opting out of
the investment or swap, that situation should be treated more prospectively
with respect to insolvency.
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the insolvency determination
can be weighted less heavily, as other factors, such as good faith, should be
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
See In re Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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allocated a higher weight. If a structurally imbalanced municipality is
currently insolvent, then insolvency is satisfied unless the calculation is
manipulated or assets are shielded—which would implicate good faith and
asset valuation respectively. If a structurally imbalanced municipality
under severe financial stress files a prospective insolvency petition, it is
likely simply a question of the date of the future insolvency, because the
structural imbalance has already manifested itself over a lengthy period of
time. In the structurally imbalanced prospective insolvency case, the court
should treat the projections less strictly, as the city will continue to
hemorrhage funds and dissipate assets if by technicality it is prevented from
utilizing Chapter 9.
2. Asset Valuation in One-Time Event Bankruptcies
Asset valuation and use in one-time event bankruptcies is another
important consideration for the bankruptcy court. While § 904 prevents
bankruptcy courts from interfering with the debtor’s property or revenues,
or the use or enjoyment of any income-producing property,407 it does not
prevent a bankruptcy court from evaluating a municipality’s good faith
utilization of an asset. Assets can be considered essential, nonessential, and
potential.
This Note previously defined essential assets as assets that are used to
provide services to residents, including government buildings, vehicles,
supplies, and infrastructure systems, as well as land generally.408 Land is
included as essential because it is specifically what Congress was protecting
when it included § 904.409 In response to the Supreme Court’s Ashton
ruling, where the Court expressed worry that a state may be “no longer free
to manage their own affairs,”410 Congress enacted § 904 to protect
“property.” When Congress instituted the Bankruptcy Code in the 1930s,
many municipalities in consideration were municipalities making large
infrastructure investments. Ashton, for example, concerned the Cameron
County Water Improvement District.411 Bekins, the case that affirmed the
constitutionality of Chapter 9 bankruptcy, concerned an irrigation
district.412 Both precedent-setting cases focused on municipalities that were
financing the expansion of essential assets to provide services to residents.
Thus, essential assets generally should not be considered in the Chapter 9
analysis.
Nonessential assets were likely not contemplated as heavily, if at all, by
Congress. This Note previously defined nonessential assets as assets that
are not critical for a municipality to provide public services, and it
identified examples of nonessential assets as art, equivalent monetary
instruments, mineral reserves, and seized, abandoned, or unused
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165.
See id.
See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 45 (1938).
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property.413 The bankruptcy court should consider nonessential assets in
the context of the insolvency and good faith analyses. It seems fair to
consider valuable mineral reserves beneath municipal lands if the extraction
of these assets could be completed in an environmentally neutral way. For
example, if the municipality is fortuitously located above precious metal
reserves in an unutilized section of the municipality, it would likely be
unfair to shield these assets from consideration in the insolvency and good
faith analyses. Of course, arguments for monetization of mineral reserves
should not be extended to argue for applications like logging or stripping
top-soil, because these applications likely interfere too much with a
municipality’s property.
Fairness seems to dictate that seized property should be considered in the
insolvency and good faith analyses. Because a municipality generally
seizes private property resulting from failure to pay monetary taxes, the
seized property should be included in insolvency calculation and in the
good faith plan confirmation analysis. Similarly, abandoned and unused
property should be considered, particularly where the property served no
public use other than in service delivery and no future public use was
planned. For example, if a municipal property used to serve as an
equipment lot and maintenance depot, but has been abandoned by a
municipality, this type of property should be considered. Park land, on the
other hand, serves a public use and generally should not be considered in
any insolvency or good faith analyses.
Art should be considered in a good faith analysis under certain
circumstances. In the simplest case, where valuable art is not accessible to
the public and is simply being held by the municipality, the asset likely
should be included in the insolvency and good faith analyses. However,
most valuable art falls into a trickier category where it is held in an art
museum or otherwise available for the public. Art museums serve the
public as attractions and also may generate visits to the municipality as a
tourist attraction, thus operating as an indirect method414 of revenue
generation for a municipality. For example, the DIA had 594,000 unique
visits, and Artvest’s report compared the DIA to New York City’s
Metropolitan Museum of Art in terms of its status as a city attraction.415 It
is less clear under those circumstances whether the entirety of a collection
should be monetized to pay creditors. But it is hard to imagine that selling,
for example, three out of 65,000 pieces of art for $230 to $440 million
would deplete the overall cultural significance of the museum.416
413. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
414. And, in some cases, a direct method if the museum is owned by the municipality and
it is profitable.
415. See ARTVEST, supra note 297, at 40–41.
416. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. The Wedding Dance, Self Portrait with
Straw Hat, and The Visitation represent between $230 and $440 million. Of course, in
certain instances a museum has a famous anchor piece, like the Mona Lisa in the Louvre,
that represents their collection and people travel in large numbers to view. In Detroit’s case,
the most significant works associated with the museum are likely the murals by Diego
Rivera, commissioned by the city in the 1930s, that are designated as a national historic
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Naturally, there is also tension between several of the sympathetic creditors,
such as pensioners, when those classes receive reduced recoveries so that a
$200 million painting can stay in an art museum.
Potential assets—such as taxes—should be considered strongly in onetime event bankruptcies in conjunction with the good faith analysis. With
the sum certain shortfall, monetization of potential assets has the ability to
alleviate the financial stress without creating a spiraling situation, where a
tax increase is available to the municipality outside of bankruptcy. If the
municipality did not pursue a reasonable potential tax increase to address
the one-time stress, electing instead for bankruptcy, this may be treated as
evidence that the municipality did not exhibit good faith.
3. Asset Valuation in Structurally Imbalanced Bankruptcies
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, utilization of nonessential assets
should be weighted highly, particularly if the nonessential assets are
significant enough to fully remedy the financial situation. For example, if a
county in Texas has $1 billion in unfunded liabilities and $5 billion in easily
obtainable mineral assets, then the municipality’s utilization of those assets
should be considered by the court in the context of the insolvency and good
faith analyses. However, if the nonessential assets cannot address the
structural imbalance, then nonessential asset utilization need only to be
considered in the good faith analysis at the confirmation stage. Finally, in a
structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, if a municipality acquired nonessential
assets using municipal funds, this would weigh toward finding that those
specific assets should be utilized in the confirmation phase as evidence of
good faith. For example, if a municipality acquired a Picasso for $100
million in 1990 using taxpayer money and desired to petition for Chapter 9
several years later, the court should at a minimum analyze the monetization
of that nonessential asset in the context of good faith in the confirmation
plan.
It is important to note that in both one-time event and structurally
imbalanced bankruptcies, the utilization of nonessential assets should be
analyzed with consideration to the liquidity of markets. The idea is that a
municipality, when contemplating Chapter 9 or devising a confirmation
plan, should, in certain situations, have its utilization of cash-convertible
assets analyzed by the courts. This should not be extrapolated to require a
municipality to monetize every nonessential asset regardless of whether
there is a real market for that asset, nor is it an argument that a municipality
should monetize the entirety of their libraries or historical societies. But
when certain high value nonessential items are in the mix, a municipality’s
utilization of those assets should be considered as described above.
Potential assets should be given low weight in structural imbalance
bankruptcy. In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the short-fall is
landmark. See ARTVEST, supra note 297, at 20. In this case, particularly if the work is
historically linked to the museum, the anchoring piece likely should be retained to maintain
the city attraction.
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accelerating and is not likely to be solved by raising taxes on the
population. This likely should be the case where the municipality has
poorer residents already subjected to significant taxes. An exception to
potential asset utilization in structural imbalanced bankruptcies would be a
municipality with a comparatively low tax rate, where the application of an
average tax rate would solve the underlying structural imbalance.
C. The Funnel to the “Good Faith” Factor
Good faith is prevalent throughout the Chapter 9 process, from petition to
confirmation, as a financially troubled municipality attempts to adjust its
debts. However, bankruptcy courts’ analyses of good faith sometimes fail
to connect the dots, leading to questionable results that may have
implications on future municipality and creditor behavior. In the petition
phase, Collier’s good faith factors provide helpful texture to analyze good
faith.417
In one-time event bankruptcies, good faith tends to be highly important
overall. It is also specifically significant in the utilization of nonessential
and potential assets and in the calculation of insolvency. In a one-time
event bankruptcy, the analysis is relatively straightforward when utilizing
the Collier factors. As was evident in Boise County, the county was
essentially solvent but was trying to dismiss a controversial judgment.418
Boise attempted to demonstrate insolvency by showing that it was not
paying debts as they became due, but the accounting utilized speculative
debt and failed to account for surplus funds and its ability to use warrants to
raise capital.419 Applying the Collier factors, the scope and nature of the
financial distress was a large, but not monumental, controversial judgment;
alternatives existed outside of Chapter 9; and its motivation was possibly
tainted. Similarly, in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal
District, the refusal to contemplate legal tax increases was evidence of bad
faith.420 Applying the Collier factors, alternatives existed outside of
Chapter 9 and the financial distress was not extraordinarily deep. In onetime filings, the Collier factors can be applied in a straightforward manner
at the petition phase.
In structurally imbalanced bankruptcies, the good faith analysis becomes
more complicated, as there are typically more interested parties involved
and rational recourse outside of Chapter 9 may be less likely. At the
petition phase, a good faith challenge can apparently be rebuffed, as it was
in Detroit, if the financial problems are the “type contemplated for Chapter
9 relief,” the reasons are consistent with the purpose of Chapter 9, the city
made efforts to improve its finances, and city residents would be severely

417. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
418. See Eileen Norcross, Boise County, Idaho files for Bankruptcy, MERCATUS CTR. AT
GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://neighborhoodeffects.mercatus.org
/2011/03/04/boise-county-idaho-files-for-bankruptcy/.
419. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 345.
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prejudiced if the case was dismissed.421 The Detroit court acknowledged
that some evidence that supported a lack of good faith, but noted that the
fact that residents would face “severe prejudice” weighed heavily toward
finding good faith.422 If a petition, like Detroit’s, is described by the judge
as a “foregone conclusion,”423 then the good faith at the petition phase is
not being given much weight in current practice. Further, in Detroit, the
judge found that the city did not meet the § 109(d)(2) “good faith”
negotiations test, but alternatively that the city satisfied the § 109(d)(3) test
that negotiations were impracticable.424
If a municipality has not advanced a plan to adjust its debts prior to the
bankruptcy petition, and a creditor’s pre-petition good faith challenge is
easily overcome in a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, then good faith at
the confirmation phase becomes even more paramount. Further, after the
initial eligibility determination, debtors have a significant amount of leeway
in the details of the plan and the treatment of each creditor class.425 The
Code requires that the bankruptcy court confirm the debt adjustment plan
only if “the plan has been proposed in good faith.”426
The application of good faith at the confirmation stage is erratic, as plans
tend to favor certain unsecured creditors over others. Favored treatment
may result from political pressure from constituents that may be voters,
taxpayers, and pension recipients at the same time, or simply sympathy for
the “plight of pensioners who are part of the local community.”427 This,
“[c]oupled with the dynamics of voter and tax-payer constituency,” may
cause municipal managers and elected officials to exhibit bias toward those
constituencies as opposed to the “faceless” bondholders.428 For example,
Detroit’s confirmation plan initially proposed less than a 10 percent
recovery for unsecured bondholders while providing a 60 percent combined
recovery for unsecured pension creditors.429 Similarly, Stockton’s proposal
allocated several bond creditors pennies on the dollar, while leaving
Stockton’s pension payments untouched. Creditors in both Stockton and
Detroit challenged the plan on the grounds of “unfair discrimination,”
arguing that the debt adjustment plans provided materially disparate
treatment to two classes of bonds having substantially similar legal rights.
On its face, this appears to run afoul of the § 1129(b)(2) requirement that no
unsecured junior creditors receive or retains any property before senior
creditors are paid and also appears to “unfairly discriminate” between
certain classes of unsecured creditors. But case law has permitted this,
yielding to the realities of complex municipal situations and recognizing
that not every creditor situation is created equally. Thus, a careful, non421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
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biased good faith analysis is paramount to achieving a fair result for the
municipality and its varying creditors.
A good faith analysis in a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy naturally
has many levels of texture to consider. For example, if a municipality is
financially undermined by a complex derivative structure that it entered into
in good faith, a smaller recovery for the derivative holder as compared to
pensioners may make sense in the good faith context. However, if the
municipality was significantly damaged by promising overly generous
deferred compensation plans to city employees, and in bankruptcy chooses
not to modify their unsecured debt while providing less than ten percent
recovery to bondholders, would generally indicate bad faith on two fronts.
First, choosing not to modify one of the main forcing functions of the filing
in the first place, particularly when that unfunded liability will grow postconfirmation, seems to indicate a lack of good faith. After all, the
bankruptcy court is not only required to find that the bankruptcy does not
unfairly discriminate at the confirmation stage, but also has to find that it
desires to effect a plan to adjust its debts. And if the debt adjustment plan
does not appear to solve the fundamental issues, questions arise as to
whether the municipality desired to effect a plan to adjust its debts in the
first place.
This situation seems analogous to Stockton, where the average firefighter
cost to Stockton was $157,000 a year in pay and benefits, with the ability to
retire at age 50.430 Typical pension benefits in Stockton were 90 percent of
an employee’s highest yearly salary plus nearly free lifetime health
benefits.431 With $800 million in unfunded liabilities and only $300 million
in general fund–backed debt, the unfunded legacy liabilities are 2.6 times
greater than the general fund debt, and that ratio would continue to climb
without modification because of increasing legacy costs, whereas some
other capital expenses can be deferred.
Stockton’s situation can be contrasted with Providence, Rhode Island, for
example, which was able to avoid bankruptcy in a situation where it faced a
$30 million annual structural deficit combined with $900 million in
unfunded pension liabilities.432 Providence’s city council voted to cap
pension benefits at 150 percent of median household income and suspend
The state legislature
yearly cost-of-living benefit adjustments.433
implemented this measure because it was worried about contagion effects in
other municipalities within the state. A previous bankruptcy filing, the
2010 Central Falls, Rhode Island petition operated as a backdrop to the
Providence bankruptcy avoidance. Central Falls, a city of 19,000 residents,
had $80 million in unfunded liabilities due to population reduction,

430.
431.
432.
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See Down and Out in Stockton, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2012, at A16.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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recession impacts, and legacy benefits.434 Prior to bankruptcy, the Rhode
Island legislature provided a statutory lien to secure general obligation
bonds to have priority in bankruptcy.435 Rhode Island was concerned that if
the bondholders were not paid the state municipal bond market would risk
exhibiting a “contagion effect,” and bondholders would be unwilling to
invest without significant interest rate increases.436 In the bankruptcy, the
unsecured pension creditors took cuts up to 55 percent, with a minimum
yearly floor, and general unsecured creditors will receive 45 percent
maximum.437 Pensioners agreed to the deal after the state agreed to
augment their pensions for five years.438
A bankruptcy court could easily apply the type of common sense analysis
used by the Rhode Island legislature to analyze good faith in the context of
bankruptcy proceedings. In a situation where legacy benefits are a primary
driver of insolvency, analyzing pension recoveries in the context of median
municipality income provides context to whether the deferred benefits were
overly generous and how much they can be modified without “severe
prejudice” to those employees. Once compared to median income, the
court can turn to the disparity of recovery percentages between the
pensioners and the remaining unsecured creditors—including bondholders,
trade, and tort creditors—to determine if the plan “unfairly discriminates.”
To apply this concept, we can use Stockton and Detroit as examples. A
city like Stockton is in contrast to Detroit, where the city arguably acted in
good faith in the modification of pensions and health benefits. In Detroit,
the average pension was not lavish, averaging approximately $19,000 per
employee and $30,000 for its police and fire retirees, as compared to
Detroit’s median income of $24,820.439 In Detroit, the sheer numbers of
retirees and lack of pre-funding fueled the massive unfunded liabilities.440
In contrast, Stockton’s average benefits were median household income is
$47,246,441 while the typical police and fire retiree benefits cost the city
approximately $141,000, nearly three times greater than the median
household income. Evidence of disproportionate benefits to public
employees combined with a plan’s failure to address underlying structural
434. Dunstan Prial, In Rhode Island Bankruptcy, Bondholders Came First, FOXBUSINESS
(July 24, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/government/2013/07/24/in-rhode-islandbankrputcy-bondholders-came-first/.
435. See id.
436. See id. For every percentage increase on a thirty-year bond, the municipality will
pay 30 percent more in interest expense over the life of the loan.
437. Steven Church & Steve Ludsin, Central Falls, Rhode Island, Bankruptcy Exit
Approved, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-0906/central-falls-rhode-island-bankruptcy-exit-approved.
438. See id.
439. See Christine MacDonald & Mike Martindale, Michigan Incomes Rise for First Time
Since 2007, DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/local/michigan/2014/09/18/michigan-household-income-census/15814085/.
440. See Chad Halcom & Kirk Pinho, Detroit Ch. 9 May Set Pension Precedent, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUS. (Aug. 4, 2013), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20130804/NEWS/
308049961/detroit-ch-9-may-set-pension-precedent.
441. See Stockton (City), California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov
/qfd/states/06/0675000.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
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problems while allocating pennies on the dollar to bondholders is the type
of unfair discrimination that, in conjunction with the municipality’s total
control over the plan, seems to be indicative of a lack of good faith.
From a public policy perspective, adopting a system where
disproportionate benefits bestowed from the public coffer are scrutinized
heavily during a Chapter 9 proceeding will inform public employee
bargaining in the future. This type of system will promote current
compensation rather than deferred compensation. Of course, retirement and
future health care could still be accommodated using a defined contribution
rather than a defined benefit system, thereby reducing the risk of
disproportionately large future payments and giving individuals more
control over their benefits. Also, if a generous deferred compensation plan
is negotiated with this type of legal precedent in place, sophisticated unions
will be able to evaluate the credit risk of a municipality in the same way
sophisticated bondholders evaluate credit risk, and courts can then reach
fair and equitable outcomes that meet the expectations of all creditors.
CONCLUSION
Municipalities face financial pressures for many reasons, including but
not limited to legacy pension and health care costs, deindustrialization,
reduced tax revenue, and poor fiscal management.442 Municipal debt is at
record highs and funding levels among municipalities are unevenly
distributed. With growing and concentrated financial pressures, municipal
bankruptcies will continue to occur and likely will increase in size and
frequency. Recent municipal bankruptcy decisions have led to questionable
and inconsistent results, and the area is ripe for a refined method of
analysis.
Analyzing municipal bankruptcy by categorizing the bankruptcy as a
one-time event bankruptcy or a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy lends
clarity to the analysis at both the petition and confirmation stage. In a onetime event bankruptcy, the court should place more weight on prospective
versus current insolvency and it should be wary of any prospective
insolvency one-time event petitions. Likewise, the pre-petition utilization
of potential and nonessential assets should be weighted heavily in the
current insolvency calculation, particularly if utilization could effectively
remedy the financial crisis. Good faith at the petition and confirmation
stage can be analyzed using the Collier factors for a one-time event
bankruptcy.
In a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy, the court should be more
inclined to permit prospective bankruptcy as long as the future projections
have reasonable clarity. Nonessential and potential assets should be
considered at the petition phase of a structurally imbalanced bankruptcy if
utilization could completely remedy the problem, and utilization should be
considered in the confirmation plan in the good faith context. Good faith
should play an extremely important role in a structurally imbalanced
442. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).

2756

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

bankruptcy, particularly at the confirmation phase, and can be informed
using common sense methods such as analyzing legacy benefits with
respect to median income. The good faith analysis also should consider
whether the municipality’s debt adjustment plan will realistically solve the
structural imbalance and lean against confirming a plan that may result in
another future filing.
The factors addressed herein are intended to provide context to the
analysis of Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings relating to the most frequent
situations that arise. Grouping the bankruptcy situations into one-time
event versus structurally imbalanced bankruptcies illuminates the critical
issues that relate to insolvency, nonessential asset usage, specific
authorization, and good faith. The test provides bankruptcy courts with an
additional framework to consider as they exercise their judgment in Chapter
9 proceedings.

